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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Jacqueline Marie Raymond
vs.
Idaho State Police Patrol Region 3,
Payette County, Scott Jacob Sloan

Supreme Court Case No. 46272-2018

CLERK’S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District,
in and for the County of Payette

HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER S. NYE

Nathan Olsen

Michael Elia

Attorney for Plaintiff

Attorney for Defendant,

Attorney for Appellant

Idaho State Police

Boise, Idaho

Attorney for Respondent
Boise, Idaho
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PA YETIE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
Jacqueline Marie Raymond
vs.
Idaho State Police Patrol Region 3, Payette County, Scott
Jacob Sloan

§
§
§
§
§

Location:
Judicial Officer:
Filed on:
Case Number History:
Appellate Case Number:

Payette County District Court
Nye, Christopher S.
10/20/2015
46272-2018

CASE INFORMATION

Bonds
Transcript Bond
8/23/2018
Counts: 1

#Clerk's Record on Appeal
Posted

Case Type:

$100.00

AA- All Initial District Court
Filings (Not E, F, and Bl)

Case 08/17/2018 Appealed Case Status: Supreme Court Appeal

DATE

CASE ASSIGNMENT

Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CV-2015-954
Payette County District Court
10/28/2015
Nye, Christopher S.

PARTY INFORMATION

Plaintiff

Raymond, Jacqueline Marie

Defendant

Idaho State Police Patrol Region 3

Elia, Michael Joseph
Retained
208-336-6900(W)

Payette County

Kane, Michael John
Retained
208-342-4545(W)

Sloan, Scott Jacob

Kane, Michael John
Retained
208-342-4545(W)
EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT

DATE

02/27/2015

Lead Attorneys
Olsen, Nathan Miles
Retained
208-523-4650(W)

INDEX

ffl Complaint Filed

10/20/2015

New Case Filed Other Claims
New Case Filed - Other Claims

10/20/2015

ROA - Converted Event
Filing: Kl - Order granting change of venue (pay to new county). Paid by: Raymond,
Jacqueline Marie (plaintiff) Receipt number: 0007804 Dated: 10/20/2015 Amount: $.00
(Cash) For: Raymond, Jacqueline Marie (plaintijj)

10/20/2015

Notice of Appearance
Plaintiff: Raymond, Jacqueline Marie Appearance Nathan M Olsen

10/20/2015

Notice of Appearance
Defendant: Payette County Appearance Michael John Kane

10/20/2015

Notice of Appearance
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PA YEITE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
Defendant: Sloan, Scott Jacob Appearance Michael John Kane
10/20/2015

Notice of Appearance
Defendant: Idaho State Police Patrol Region 3 Appearance Michael Joseph Elia

10/20/2015

Order
Order o/Voluntary Disqualification

10/20/2015

Request
for Reassignment

10/28/2015

Order
Order ofAssignment

10/28/2015

Change Assigned Judge
Change Assigned Judge

11/13/2015

Notice
Notice ofChange ofAddress

11/13/2015

Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Hearing

11/13/2015

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 12/03/2015 01: 30 PM)

11/18/2015

Notice of Hearing
Amended Notice Of Hearing

11/18/2015

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 12/03/2015 01: 30 PM: Hearing Vacated
Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment

11/18/2015

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled O1107/2016 01: 30 PM) Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

11/18/2015

Notice
Notice ofHearing on Motion to Dismiss Defendant Idaho State Police

12/03/2015

CANCELED Motion to Dismiss (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Vacated
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on
12/03/2015 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated

12/24/2015

Motion
Motion to Compel Discovery to Idaho State Police

12/24/2015

Notice
Notice ofHearing

12/29/2015

Objection
Objection to Defendant Idaho State Police's Rule 12(b)(5) Motion or Alternatively Motion to
Extend Time For Service

12/29/2015

Memorandum
Memorandum in Support of Objection to Defendant Idaho State Police's Rule 12(b)(5) Motion
or Alternatively Motion to Extend Time For Service

12/29/2015

Affidavit
Affidavit ofNathan M Olsen
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PA YETIE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
12/31/2015

Notice
Notice o/Withdrawal ofMotion to Compel

12/31/2015

Notice
DefIdaho State Police's Notice of Withdrawal ofMotion to Dismiss

01/04/2016

Affidavit
Affidavit ofNathan Olsen

01/04/2016

Reply
to Plaintiffs Response to Defedants' Motion to Dismiss Regarding Failure to File a Tort Claim

01/04/2016

Reply
to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Regarding Failure to Post a Bond

01/04/2016

Response
in Opposition to Defendants Scott Sloan and Payette County's Motion to Dismiss

01/07/2016

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 01/0712016 01: 30 PM· Hearing Held
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss

01/07/2016

Court Minutes
Court Minutes

01/07/2016

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Leda Waddle
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated:

01/07/2016

Hearing Scheduled (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss Hearing result for Hearing
Scheduled scheduled on 01/07/2016 01:30 PM: Hearing Held

01/19/2016

Affidavit
Affidavit of Theodore Wood in Response to Payette County Reply in Support ofMotion for
Partial Summary Judgment

01/19/2016

Response
Payette County's DefResponse to the Affidavit ofJason Wood

02/04/2016

I

'fflAnswer
Defendant Idaho State Police's Answer to Complaint

02/18/2016

Notice of Service
Notice Of Service ofDiscovery

03/11/2016

Stipulation
Stipulation for entry ofProtective Order

03/11/2016

Order
Protective Order

03/22/2016

Notice of Service
Notice OfService

04/04/2016

Notice
Of Compliance
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PA YE'ITE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
04/11/2016

Notice of Service
Notice OfService ofDiscovery

04/12/2016

Request
for Status Conference

04/13/2016

Notice
Notice ofHearing

04/13/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Status 05/04/2016 09:00 AM) Telephonic Status Conference

05/04/2016

Hearing Held
Hearing result/or Status scheduled on 05/04/2016 09:00 AM· Hearing Held Telephonic Status
Conference

05/04/2016

Court Minutes
Court Minutes

05/04/2016

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Tammy Weber
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated:

05/04/2016

Status Conference (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Telephonic Status Conference Hearing result/or Status scheduled on 05/04/2016 09:00 AM:
Hearing Held

05/18/2016

Notice of Service
Notice OfService

05/18/2016

Notice of Service
Notice OfService ofDiscovery

05/18/2016

Motion
Defs Motion Pursuant to Rule 26 for a Protective Order

05/18/2016

Memorandum
Memorandum in Support

05/18/2016

Affidavit
Affidavit of Michael Kane

05/18/2016

Notice
Notice ofHearing

05/18/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/13/2016 09:30 AM) Motion/or Protective Order

06/08/2016

Stipulation
Stipulated Litigation Plan

06/10/2016

Notice
Of Compliance

06/14/2016

Order
Setting Pretrial and Jury Trial

06/23/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 05/18/201711:00 AM) JT 7/24/17
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PAYETTE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
06/23/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/24/2017 09:00 AM) JO days

07/06/2016

Miscellaneous
Objection to DefPayette County's Motion for Protective Order

07/07/2016

Motion
to Appear by Telephone

07/08/2016

Motion
ISP Motion to Appear by Telephone

07/08/2016

Motion
Motion to Appear Telephonically for Hearing

07/08/2016

Reply
to Pl's Objection to Defs Motion/or Protective Order

07/12/2016

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 07/13/2016 09:30 AM: Hearing Vacated Motion/or
Protective Order

07/12/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion For Protective Order 08/29/2016 01:30 PM)

07/12/2016

Stipulation
Stipulated Motion to Vacate Hearing

07/12/2016

Order
Adopting Stipulated Litigation Plan

07/13/2016

CANCELED Motion Hearing (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Vacated
Motion/or Protective Order Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 07/13/2016 09:30 AM:
Hearing Vacated

07/20/2016

Notice
Of Compliance

07/21/2016

Notice
Of Compliance

08/02/2016

Notice of Hearing

08/26/2016

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result/or Motion For Protective Order scheduled on 08/29/2016 01:30 PM: Hearing
Vacated

08/29/2016

CANCELED Motion for Protective Order (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Vacated
Hearing result for Motion For Protective Order scheduled on 08/29/2016 OJ: 30 PM: Hearing
Vacated

08/31/2016

Stipulation
for Protective Order Regarding Confidential Information

09/21/2016

Notice
Of Compliance

09/21/2016

Notice
o/Taking Deposition Duces Tecum ofT Jason Wood
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PA YEITE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMAR Y
CASE No. CV-2015-954
09/23/2016

Notice of Service

09/30/2016

Motion
Pt's Motion to Amend Complaint

10/06/2016

Memorandum
Defendant Payette County Memorandum in Opposition to Pt's Motion to Amend

10/06/2016

Affidavit
ofPayette County Clerk Julie Anderson

10/07/2016

Notice
Notice ofHearing

10/07/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion I 1/28/2016 01:30 PM) Pt's Motion to Amend Complaint

10/11/2016

~Notice of Hearing

10/12/2016

fflMotion
Defs Payette County Motion/or Partial Dismissal

10/12/2016

ffl Memorandum
in Support ofDefPayette County's Rule 12 Motion/or Partial Dismissal

10/18/2016

Notice
Notice of Taking Deposition ofPl Jacie Raymond

11/03/2016

Notice
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition ofPl Jackie Raymond

11/14/2016

~Motion
Def JSP's Joinder in Payette County's Motion for Partial Dismissal Pursuant to JRCP 12 (b)(6)

11/14/2016

Memorandum
Def JSP's Joinder in Payette County's Memorandum in Opposition to Pl's Motion to Amend

11/17/2016

Memorandum
Defendant Idaho State Police's Joinder in Payette County's Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend

11/22/2016

Reply
in Support ofPt's Motion to Amend Complaint

11/23/2016

m

11/23/2016

fflReply

I

BriefFiled
Payette County Reply Brief in Support ofMotion for Partial Dismissal

Def JSP's Reply to Pt's Response in Opposition to Rule 12 Motion for Partial Dismissal
11/25/2016

Motion
Def Payette County's Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment

11/25/2016

Affidavit
Affidavit of Gary Raney in Support ofDefPayette County's Motion/or Partial Summary
Judgment
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PAYETTE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
11/25/2016

Affidavit
Affidavit ofMichael Kane in Support ofDefPayette County's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

11/25/2016

Memorandum
in Support ofDefPayette County's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

11/25/2016

fflResponse
in Opposition to DefPayette County's Rule 12 Motion for Partial Dismiss

11/28/2016

Hearing Held
Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 11/28/2016 01:30 PM: Hearing Held Pl's Motion to
Amend Complaint
Defs Motion/or Partial Dismissal

11/28/2016

Court Minutes
Court Minutes

11/28/2016

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Tammy Weber
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated:

11/28/2016

Motion Hearing (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Pt's Motion to Amend Complaint
Defs Motion/or Partial Dismissal Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 11/28/2016 01:30
PM· Hearing Held

12/01/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 02115/2017 01: 30 PM)

12/01/2016

Notice of Hearing

12/12/2016

Order
Approving Stipulation/or protective Order Regarding Confidential Information

12/14/2016

Notice
Amended Notice ofHearing

12/14/2016

Continued
Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment scheduled on 02115/2017 OJ: 30 PM:
Continued

12/14/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment 03/29/2017 01:30 PM)

12/30/2016

ffl Memorandum
Decision and Order on Pl's Motion to Amend Complaint and Defs Motion to Dismiss Counts
II and III

01/18/2017

ffl Partial Judgment Or Opinion Filed
Of Dismissal ofIdaho State Police Only

01/24/2017

Memorandum
Defendant Idaho State Police's Memorandum of Costs

01/24/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit ofMichael J. Elia in Support ofDefendant Idaho State Police's Memorandum of
Costs

PAGE 70F 27

Page 8

Printed on 09/19/2018 at 2:26 PM

PA YETIE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
02/15/2017

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment scheduled on 02/15/2017 OJ: 30 p M:
Continued

02/21/2017

Amended Complaint Filed
Amended Complaint Filed

02/23/2017

Answer
DefPayette County and Scott Sloan's Answer to Pt's Amended Complaint and Demand/or
Jury Trial

02/27/2017

Notice of Service

03/13/2017

Stipulation
Stipulation to Extend Expert Disclosure and Discovery CutoffDates

03/15/2017

Order
Order Allowing Extension of Time for Expert Witness Disclosure and Discovery Cutoff

03/21/2017

Response
Response in Opposition to Defend Payette County's Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment

03/21/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit ofNathan Olsen

03/21/2017

Motion
Motion to Strike the Affidavit o/Gary L. Raney and/or Other Relief

03/21/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit ofNathan Olsen in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Affidavit ofGary L.
Raney

03/21/2017

Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Hearing (Motion to Strike Affidavit o/Gary L. Raney 3/29/2017 1:30 p.m.)

03/29/2017

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment scheduled on 03/29/2017 OJ: 30 PM:
Hearing Held Motion to Strike Affidavit of Gary L. Raney

03/29/2017

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Motion to Strike Affidavit o/Gary L. Raney Hearing result/or Motion/or Partial Summary
Judgment scheduled on 03/29/2017 OJ: 30 PM: Hearing Held

04/03/2017

Notice of Completion
Notice Of Compliance

04/06/2017

Notice of Completion
Notice Of Compliance

04/13/2017

Notice of Service
Notice OfService

04/18/2017

Notice of Service
Notice OfService

04/19/2017

Motion
DefPayette County Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Intrusion Upon
Seclusion Claim

04/19/2017

Memorandum
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PAYETTE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
Memorandum in Support ofDefPayette County Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Regarding Intrusion Upon Seclusion Tort Claim
04/19/2017

Affidavit
Second Affidavit ofBetty Dressen in Support ofDefPayette County Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

04/19/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit ofMichael Kane in Support ofDefPayette County Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Regarding Intrusion Upon Seclusion Tort Claim

04/19/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit of Charles Huff in Support ofDefPayette County Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Regarding Intrusion Upon Seclusion Tort Claim

04/19/2017

Notice
Notice ofHearing

04/19/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 05/22/2017 01:30 PM)

04/21/2017

Memorandum
Memorandum in Support ofDefs Payette County Motion to Strike/Motion in limine
Concerning PJ's Expert Witness Carolyn Barnhart

04/21/2017

Motion
Motion to Strike/Motion in Limine Concerning Pt's Expert Witness Carolyn Barnhart

04/21/2017

Notice
Notice ofHearing

04/21/2017

Notice of Completion
Notice Of Compliance

04/24/2017

Motion
Defendant Payette County's Motion for Summary Judgment

04/24/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit ofScott Sloan in Support ofDefendant Payette County's Motion for Summary
Judgment

04/24/2017

Memorandum
Memorandum in Support ofDefendant Payette County's Motion for Summary Judgment

04/24/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit of Gary Raney in Support ofDefendant Payette County's Motion for Summary
Judgment

04/24/2017

Notice of Hearing
Notice OfHearing-5/22/2017 l:30p.m.

04/28/2017

Motion
Def Payette County Motion in Limine Concerning Pt's Claimed Damages

04/28/2017

Memorandum
Memorandum in Support ofDefPayette County's Motion in Limine Concerning PJ's Claimed
Damages

04/28/2017

Notice
Notice ofHearing
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PAYETTE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
04/28/2017

Notice
Notice ofHearing

04/28/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit ofKenn Meneely

04/28/2017

Motion
Motion In Limine Re Alcohol Consumption ofDecedent Barry Johnson

05/02/2017

Notice
Notice ofDeposition Duces Te cum ofLt Andy Creech

05/02/2017

Notice
Notice of Taking Deposition ofPayette County Sheriff Charles Huff

05/03/2017

Memorandum
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Payette County's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and Denying Pl's Motion to Strike Gary Raney's Affidavit

05/04/2017

Motion
Plaintiff's 56(d) Motion for Continuance to Allow Discovery in Advance ofSummary Judgment
Hearing

05/04/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit ofNathan Olsen in Support ofPlaintiff's 56(d) Motion for Continuance to Allow
Discovery in Advance ofSummary Judgment Hearing

05/04/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/18/2017 11:00 AM) for Continuance to Allow Discovery in
Advance ofSummary Judgment Hearing

05/08/2017

Memorandum
Defendant Payette County's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine: RE
Alcohol Consumption ofDecendent

05/10/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit ofNathan Olsen in Support ofResponse in Opposition to DefPayette County's
Motion for Summary Judgment

05/10/2017

Response
Response in Opposition to DefPayette County's Motion for Summary Judgment

05/12/2017

Notice
Notice ofNon-opposition to Pl's 56(d) Motion for Continuance to Allow Discovery

05/15/2017

Miscellaneous
Defendant Payette County's Compliance with Pretrial Order

05/15/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit ofJackie Raymond

05/15/2017

Response
Response in Opposition to DefPayette County Motion in Limine Re Barnhart and Claimed
Damages

05/16/2017

Notice of Service
Notice OfService

05/16/2017

Stipulation
Stipulation to Continue Pretrial Conference

PAGE IOOF 27

Page 11

I

Printed on 09/19/2018 at 2:26 PM

PA YETIE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
05/16/2017

Continued
Continued (Pretrial Conference 05122/20 I 7 0 I: 30 PM) JT 7124/J 7

05/16/2017

Miscellaneous
Defendant Payette County's Compliance with Pretrial Order

05/16/2017

Miscellaneous
Reply Brief in Support ofDefendant Payette County's Motion for Summary Judgment

05/16/2017

Stipulation
Stipulation Pursuant to the Court's Order Setting Pretrial Coriference

05/17/2017

Continued
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 05/18/2017 I I :00 AM· Continued/or Continuance to
Allow Discovery in Advance ofSummary Judgment Hearing

05/17/2017

Notice of Completion
Notice Of Compliance

05/18/2017

Miscellaneous
Payette County's Reply in Support ofMotions in Limine Re: Carolyn Barnhart and Claimed
Damages

05/18/2017

Miscellaneous
Reply in Support ofMotion in Limine Re: Alcohol Consumption ofDecedent Barry Johnson

05/18/2017

Motion Hearing ( 11 :00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
for Continuance to Allow Discovery in Advance ofSummary Judgment Hearing Hearing result
for Motion scheduled on 05118/2017 I 1:00 AM· Continued

05/22/2017

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment scheduled on 05/22/2017 0 I: 30 PM·
Hearing Held Defs Motion to Strike/Motn In Limine Re: Pt's &pert Witness/Defs Motn in
Limine/Pl's Motion in Limine/Motion for Continuance to Allow Discovery in Advance of
Summary Judgment Hearing

05/22/2017

Hearing Held
Hearing result/or Pretrial Conference scheduled on 05/22/2017 01:30 PM: Hearing HeldJT
7/24117

05/22/2017

Court Minutes
Court Minutes

05/22/2017

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Tammy Weber
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated:

05/22/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment 06/20/2017 10:30 AM) Hearing to
be held in Canyon County

05/22/2017

Pre-trial Conference (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
JT 7124117 Hearing result/or Pretrial Conference scheduled on 05/22/2017 01:30 PM:
Hearing Held

05/22/2017

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Defs Motion to Strike/Motn In Limine Re: Pt's &pert Witness/Defs Motn in Limine/Pl's
Motion in Limine/Motionfor Continuance to Allow Discovery in Advance of Summary
Judgment Hearing Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment scheduled on
05/22/2017 01:30 PM: Hearing Held
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PA YETIE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
05/25/2017

Notice of Service
Notice Oj"Service

05/26/2017

Notice of Service
Notice Oj"Service

05/31/2017

Notice
Notice ofHearing

05/31/2017

Memorandum
Memorandum Decision and Order on Motions Heard May 22, 2107

06/05/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit ofMichael Kane in Support ofSupplemental Evidence for Defs Motion in Limine
Regarding Damages

06/05/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit ofMichael Kane in Support of Defs Motion In Limine Regarding Evidentiary Matters
and Motion for Court Order Governing Trial Proceedings

06/05/2017

Memorandum
Memorandum in Support ofDefPayette County Motion for Entry of Court Order Governing
Trial Proceedings

06/05/2017

Memorandum
Memorandum in Support ofDefPayette County Motion In Limine Concerning Pretrial
Evidentiary Matters

06/05/2017

Motion
DefPayette County Motion for Entry of Court Order Governing Trial Proceedings

06/05/2017

Motion
DefPayette County Motion in Limine Concerning Pretrial Evidentiary Matters and Standard
to Declare Mistrial

06/05/2017

Notice
Notice ofHearing

06/05/2017

Notice
Notice ofHearing

06/07/2017

Response
Response in Opposition to Defendant Payette County's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Regarding Intrusion Upon Seclusion Claim

06/07/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit of Nathan Olsen in Support ofResponse in Opposition to Defendant Payette County's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Intrusion Upon Seclusion Claim

06/07/2017

Motion
Motion to Vacate Trial and Extend Expert Disclosure Deadlines

06/07/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit ofNathan olsen in support of Motion to Vacate Trial Setting

06/07/2017

Notice of Hearing
Notice Oj"Hearing-6/20/2017 10:30 Motion to Vacate Trial and Extend Expert Disclosure
Deadlines

06/12/2017

Memorandum
Defendant Payette County's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Trial
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PAYETTE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
and Extend Disclosure Deadlines
06/12/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit ofMichael Kane in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Trial and Extend
Disclosure/ Deadlines

06/12/2017

Motion
Motion to Intervene Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 24(A)(I) for Purpose ofAsserting Rights and
Privileges on Behalf of&ott Sloan Assertion ofPrivilege and Request for Award ofAttorney
Fees Againse Plaintiff's Counsel

06/12/2017

Memorandum
Memorandum in Support ofMotion to Intervene Pursuant to I.RC.P. 24(A)(J) for Purpose of
Asserting Rights and Privileges on Behalf of&ott Sloan, Assertion ofPrivilege, and Request
for Award ofAttorney Fees Against Plaintiffs Counsel

06/12/2017

Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Hearing- Motion to Intervene-June 20, 2017 at 10:30 a.m.

06/12/2017

Motion
Motion for Exparte Order Shortening Time for Notice ofHearing

06/12/2017

Motion
Motion for Exparte Order Shortening Time for Notice ofHearing

06/12/2017

Motion
DefPayette County Motion for Award ofAttny Fees

06/12/2017

Memorandum
Memorandum in Support ofDefPayette County Motion for Award ofAttorney Fees

06/12/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit of Michael Kane in Support ofMotion for Pretective Order

06/12/2017

Motion
DefPayette County Motion for Protective Order

06/12/2017

Memorandum
Memorandum in Support ofDefPayette County Motion for for Protective Order

06/12/2017

Miscellaneous
Reply Brief in Support ofPayette County Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Intrusion

06/12/2017

Notice
ofHearing

06/14/2017

Response to Request for Discovery
Plaintiff's Supplemental Response to Defendant's Motion for Protective Order

06/15/2017

Reply
to Pt's Response to Payette County's Various Motion Set for Hearing

06/16/2017

Motion
Def Payette County Motion in Limine Re: Pt's Disclosed Experts

06/16/2017

Memorandum
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Pl's Disclosed Experts

06/16/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit of Michael Kane in Support of Def Payette County Motion In Limine Re Pt's
Disclosed Experts
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PAYETIE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
06/16/2017

Affidavit
Second Affidavit ofMichael Kane in Support ofDefs Motion in Limine Re Evidentiary Matters

06/16/2017

Miscellaneous
Written Response to Payette County's Various Motions

06/16/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit ofJackie Raymond

06/16/2017

Affidavit
Affidavit ofNathan Olsen in Support ofthe Written Response to Payette Countyls Various
Motions

06/20/2017

Continued
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 07/24/2017 09:00 AM: Continued 1Odays

06/20/2017

Court Minutes
Court Minutes

06/20/2017

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Tammy Weber
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated:

06/20/2017

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)

II

Hearing to be held in Canyon County
Motion to Vacate Trial and Extend Expert Disclosure and Discovery Deadlines Hearing result
for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment scheduled on 06/20/2017 10:30 AM: Hearing Held

06/21/2017

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment scheduled on 06/20/2017 I 0: 30 AM:
Hearing Held Hearing to be held in Canyon County
Motion to Vacate Trial and Extend Expert Disclosure and Discovery Deadlines

06/21/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion in Limine 07/24/2017 01:30 PM) Re: Pt's Disclosed Experts

06/21/2017

Notice of Service

06/21/2017

Notice of Service

06/21/2017

Notice of Hearing

06/30/2017

Request
for Clarification and Motion to Bifurcate Trial

06/30/2017

Request
for Scheduling Conference

06/30/2017

Notice of Hearing

07/17/2017

Affidavit
ofNathan Olsen In Support of Memo in Opposition to Payette County's Motion in Limine Re
Pt's Disclosed Experts

07/17/2017

Memorandum
in Opposition to Payette County's Motion in Limine Re Pt's Disclosed Experts

07/19/2017

Reply
to Pt's Response to DefPayette County Motion in Limine Re Pt's Disclosed Experts
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PA YETIE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
07/21/2017

Notice
OfCompliance

07/24/2017

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Motion in Limine scheduled on 07/24/2017 OJ: 30 PM: Hearing Held Re:
Pt's Disclosed Experts and Scheduling Hearing

07/24/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/23/2018 09:00 AM)

07/24/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 03/15/2018 09:00 AM) to be held Canyon County

07/24/2017

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Tammy Weber
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated:

07/24/2017

Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
07/24/2017-08/04/2017
JO days Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 07/24/2017 09:00 AM: Continued

07/24/2017

Motion in Limine (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Re: Pt's Disclosed Experts and Scheduling Hearing Hearing result for Motion in Limine
scheduled on 07/24/2017 01:30 PM: Hearing Held

07/24/2017

Court Minutes

07/25/2017

Motion
Motion for Partial Dismissal Pursuant JRCP 12(b)(6)

07/25/2017

Memorandum
Memorandum in Support ofDefPayette County's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to JRCP I 2(b)
(6)

07/25/2017

Notice
Notice ofHearing

07/25/2017

Notice of Service
Notice Of Service

07/25/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/28/2017 08:30 AM) to be held in Canyon County

07/25/2017

Memorandum
in Support ofDefPayette County's Motion In Limine Re Post Occurrence Remedial Measures

07/25/2017

Motion
ofDef Payette County's Motion In Limine Re Post Occu"ence Remedial Measures

07/25/2017

Notice of Hearing

07/26/2017

Notice
Notice ofHearing

08/10/2017

Order
Protective Order Concerning Scott Sloan's Personal Medical Records and lriformation

08/15/2017

Notice of Completion
Notice Of Compliance
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
08/25/2017

Continued
Continued (Motion 0911112017 03:00 PM) to be held in Payette County

08/25/2017

Order
Order to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing

08/25/2017

Stipulation
Stipulation to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing

08/25/2017

Memorandum
Memorandum Decision and Order on Payette County's Motion in Limine

08/30/2017

Notice
Amended Notice ofHearing

08/30/2017

Notice
Amended Notice ofHearing

08/30/2017

Notice
Amended Notice ofHearing

08/31/2017

Response
Response in Opposition to Defendant Payette County's "Motion in Limine Regarding Post
Occurrence Remedial Measures"

08/31/2017

Response
Response in Opposition to Defendant Payette County's "Response for Clarification and Motion
to Bifurcate Trial"

08/31/2017

Objection
Objection to Defendant's "Motion for Partial Dismissal Pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(6)"

09/05/2017

Miscellaneous
Reply Brief in Support ofDefPayette County Motion in Limine Re: Post Occurrence Remedial
Measures

09/05/2017

Miscellaneous
Reply Brief in Support ofMotion for Partial Dismissal Pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(6)

09/05/2017

Miscellaneous
Reply Brief in Support ofRequest for Clarification and Motion to Bifurcate Trial

09/11/2017

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 09/11/2017 03:00 PM· Hearing Held to be held in
Payette County

09/11/2017

Court Minutes
Court Minutes

09/11/2017

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Tammy Webber
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated:

09/ll/2017

Motion Hearing (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
to be held in Payette County Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 0911112017 03:00 PM:
Hearing Held

09/18/2017

Miscellaneous
Objection to Defs Proposed Orders
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
09/29/2017

Order
Order Setting Pretrial and Jury Trial

09/29/2017

ROA - Converted Event
Request for Trial Setting

09/29/2017

fflorder
on Defs IRCP 12(b)(6) Motion/or Partial Dismissal and Motion in Limine Re: Subsequent
Remedial Measures

10/02/2017

Notice of Service
Notice OfService

10/13/2017

Notice
Notice of Taking Deposition ofBrandon Eller

10/17/2017

Notice
Notice of Taking Deposition ofJacqueline Lisle

10/17/2017

Notice
Notice of Taking Deposition ofDale Lisle

10/17/2017

Notice
Notice of Taking Deposition ofRosemary Melcher

10/18/2017

Notice
Notice of Taking Deposition ofFred Rice

10/18/2017

Notice
Notice of Taking Deposition ofTerry Murdock

10/20/2017

Affidavit of Service
Affidavit OfService

10/24/2017

10/24/2017

fflNotice
of Taking Deposition ofCarolyn Barnhart

ffl Acknowledgment
ofService ofSubpoena and Notice ofDeposition

10/25/2017

10/26/2017

fflNotice
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition ofFred Rice

ffl Memorandum
Decision on Defs Request for Clarification

10/26/2017

~ Affidavit of Service

10/26/2017

ffl Notice of Service

10/30/2017

ffl Affidavit of Service

11/01/2017

~Notice
Of Compliance
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
ll/08/2017

fflNotice
Amended Notice a/Taking Deposition a/Carolyn Barnhart

11/13/2017

ffl Notice of Service

ll/13/2017

fflNotice
Second Amended Notice a/Taking Deposition ofFred Rice

ll/20/2017

fflPetition
Justin Klitch's Petition to Quash Subpoena for Records and Motion for Protective Order

ll/20/2017

ffl Memorandum
in Support ofJustin Klitch's Petition to Quash Subpoena for Production ofRecords and
Motion for Protective Order

11/20/2017

ffl Affidavit
ofCounsel in Support ofJustin Klitch's Petition to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective
Order

ll/28/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/03/2018 09:00 AM) to be held in Canyon County

ll/28/2017

ffl Notice of Hearing
of Hearing on Justin Klitch's Petition to Quash Subpoena for Records and Motion for
Protective Order.

11/29/2017

fflNotice of Hearing

11/29/2017

fflMotion
Payette County's Motion to Quash Subpoena for Records; Motion/or Protective Order as it
Relates to Attorney Work Product Privilege; and Request for Attorney Fees

ll/29/2017

~ Memorandum
in Support ofPayette County's Motion to Quash Subpoena for Records; Motion for Protective
Order as it Relates to Attorney Work Product Privilege; and Request for Attorney Fees

11/29/2017

fflAffidavit
ofMichael Kane in Support of Payette County's Motion to Quash Subpoena for Records;
Motion for Protective Order as it Relates to Attorney Work Product Privilege; and Request for
Attorney Fees

ll/30/2017

fflNotice
O/Service

12/12/2017

fflNotice

OfCompliance
12/18/2017

fflNotice

Of Compliance
12/21/2017

fflMotion
for Change of Venue
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
12/21/2017

ffl Affidavit
ofJackie Raymond in Support ofMotion for Change of Venue

12/21/2017

fflNotice of Hearing

12/27/2017

~ Memorandum
Payette County's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion/or Change of Venue

12/27/2017

12/28/2017

12/28/2017

mAffidavit
ofMichael Kane in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion/or Change of Venue
Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/18/201811:00 AM) to be held in Canyon County

ffl Notice of Hearing
Amended Notice Of Hearing on Just Klitch's Petition to Quash Subpoena/or Records and
Motion/or Protective Order

12/28/2017

~Notice of Hearing
Amended

12/28/2017

~ Notice of Hearing
Amended

01/03/2018

Hearing Held
Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 01/03/2018 09:00AM: Hearing Held to be held in
Canyon County

01/03/2018

Motion Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
to be held in Canyon County Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 01/03/2018 09:00 AM:
Hearing Held

01/16/2018

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/31/2018 01:30 PM) to be held in Canyon County

01/16/2018

ffl Affidavit
of Michael Kane Support of Payette County's Motion for Discovery Sanctions for Failure to
Disclose

01/16/2018

fflMotion
Payette County's Motion for Discovery Sanctions for Failure to Disclose

01/16/2018

ffl Memorandum
in Support ofPayette County's Motion/or Discovery Sanctions/or Failure to Disclose

01/16/2018

fflNotice of Hearing

01/16/2018

ffl Affidavit
of Michael Kane Support of Payette County's Motion to Allow Use of Video Deposition

01/16/2018

ffl Memorandum
in Support ofPayette County's Motion to Allow Use of Video Deposition

01/16/2018
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
fflMotion
Payette County's Motion to A/law Use of Video Deposition Motion
01/16/2018

fflNotice of Hearing

01/16/2018

~ Memorandum
in Support ofPayette County's Motion to Strike/Motion in Limine Re: Non-retained &pert

01/16/2018

~Motion
Payette County's Motion Motion to Strike/Motion in Limine Re: Non-retained &pert

01/16/2018

ffl Notice of Hearing

01/16/2018

mAffidavit
ofMichael Kane in Support ofPayette County Motion in Limine Re: 911 Calls

01/16/2018

'3 Affidavit
ofLinda Hoxie in Support ofPayette County Motion in Limine Re: 911 Calls

01/16/2018

ffl Memorandum
in Support of Payette County Motion in Limine Re: 911 Calls

01/16/2018

ffl Notice of Hearing

01/16/2018

~Affidavit
ofMichael Kane in Support of Payette County Motion in Limine/Motion to Strike Re: &cerpts
of Carmack Report

01/16/2018

~ Memorandum
in Support ofPayette County Motion in Limine/Motion to Strike Re: &cerpts ofCarmack
Report

01/16/2018

mMotion
Payette County Motion in Limine/Motion to Strike Re: &cerpts of Carmack Report

01/16/2018

mNotice of Hearing

01/16/2018

ffl Affidavit
ofMichael Kane in Support ofPayette County Motion in Limine/Motion to Strike Re: NonRetained ISP &pert Witnesses

01/16/2018

m

Memorandum
in Support ofPayette County Motion in Limine/Motion to Strike Re: Non-Retained ISP &pert
Witnesses

01/16/2018

fflMotion
Payette County Motion in Limine/Motion to Strike Re: Non-Retained ISP &pert Witnesses

01/16/2018

mNotice
of Hearing

01/16/2018
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
fflobjection
to Payette County's Motion to Quash Subpoena/or Records; Motion/or Protectiver Order;
and Request/or Attorney Fees
01/16/2018

fflobjection
to Justin Klitch's Petition to Quash Subpoena/or Records

01/16/2018

fflAffidavit
ofNathan Olsen

01/16/2018

~Reply
In Support of Motion for Change of Venue

01/16/2018

fflReply
to Plaintiff's Response to Payette County's Motion to Quash Subpoena/or Records; Motion/or
Protective Order as it Relates to Attorney Work Product Privilege; and Request for Attorney
Fees

01/16/2018

m

01/16/2018

ffl Affidavit

BriefFiled
Reply Brief in Support ofJustin Klitch's Petition to Quash Subpoena/or Records and Motion
for Protective Order

ofMelissa Stroh in Support ofDefs Motion in Limine Regarding 911 Dispatchers Calls after
Notification

01/16/2018

fflMotion
Defs Motion in Limine Regarding 911 Dispatchers Calls after Notification

01/18/2018

Hearing Held
Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 01/18/201811:00 AM: Hearing Held to be held in
Canyon County

01/18/2018

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Tamara Weber
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated:

01/18/2018

Motion Hearing (11:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
to be held in Canyon County Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 01/18/2018 11:00 AM:
Hearing Held

01/18/2018
01/26/2018

ffl Court Minutes
fflNotice
Amended Notice of Hearing

01/29/2018

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/09/2018 01:30 PM) to be held in Canyon County

01/31/2018

Hearing Held
Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 01/31/2018 01:30 PM: Hearing Held to be held in
Canyon County

01/31/2018

Motion Hearing (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)

to be held in Canyon County Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 01/31/2018 01:30 PM:
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
Hearing Held

02/05/2018

m

Declaration
ofJackie Raymond

02/05/2018

mAffidavit
ofNathan Olsen In Support Motions heard on 2/9/18

02/05/2018

mResponse
in Opposition to Payette County Motion to Strike/Motion In Limine Re: Pl Expert Witness
Carlie Corbin

02/05/2018

ffl Response
in Opposition to Payette County Motion in Limine/Motion to Strike Excerpts ofCarmack's
Accident Report

02/05/2018

02/05/2018

fflResponse
in Opposition to Payette County Motion to Strike/Motion in Limine Re: Pl's Non-Retained ISP
Expert Witnesses

ffl Response
in Opposition to Payette County's Motion in Llmine Re: 911 Dispatchers Calls After
Notification

02/05/2018

~Objection
to Payette County Motion for Discovery Sanctions for Failure to Disclose

02/07/2018

~Reply
to Pl's Opposition to Def Payette County Motion in Limine Re: 911 calls

02/07/2018

fflReply
to Pl's Opposition to Def Payette County Motion in Limine/Motion to Strike Carmack's
Accident

02/07/2018

fflReply
to Pl's Opposition to DefPayette County Motion to Strike/Motion in Limine ISP Expert

02/07/2018

fflReply
to Pl's Opposition to Payette County Motion for Discovery Sanctions

02/07/2018

fflReply
to Pl's Opposition to DefPayette County Motion to Strike/Motion in Limine

02/07/2018

fflNotice
ofNo Opposition to Payette County Motion to Allw Use of Video Deposition

02/09/2018

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 02/09/2018 01:30 PM: Hearing Held to be held in
Canyon County

02/09/2018

Motion Hearing (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
to be held in Canyon County Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 02/0912018 01: 30 PM:
Hearing Held

PAGE220F27

Page 23

Printed on 09/19/2018 at 2:26 PM

PA YE'ITE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
02/09/2018

~ Court Minutes

02/12/2018

~Order
Granting Defs Motion to Quash Subpoena and Denying Pt's Motion for Change of Venue

02/22/2018

fflNotice
ofAssociation of Counsel

02/28/2018

't;Notice
Oj'Compliance

02/28/2018

fflNotice
Of Compliance

02/28/2018

'ffi!Notice
Of' Compliance

03/05/2018

fflorder
Re Defendant Payette County's Motions Heard February 9, 2018

03/06/2018

ffl Notice of Taking Deposition
ofJulie Bonsall

03/06/2018

~ Notice of Taking Deposition
of DP Van Blaricom

03/06/2018

'§Notice of Taking Deposition
ofBilly Brummett

03/06/2018

~ Notice of Taking Deposition
ofRob Raynor

03/06/2018

~ Notice of Taking Deposition
of Colleen Rheault

03/06/2018

ffl Notice of Taking Deposition
ofGary Clark

03/06/2018

03/06/2018

03/06/2018

m

Notice of Taking Deposition
ofAnthony Johnson

fflNotice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum
of Carol Jacques

ffl Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum
ofBrian Pearce

03/06/2018

03/07/2018

ffl0rder
Denying Defendant's Motion to Exclude the 911 Dispatch Tapes

ffl Affidavit of Service
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
Affidavit OfService (6)

03/07/2018

~Notice
of Taking Deposition ofPaul Duplissie

03/07/2018

~Notice
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum ofDP Van Blaricom

03/07/2018

~Notice
DefPayette County's Compliance with Pretrial Order

03/07/2018

mNotice
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition ofGary Clark

03/07/2018

~Notice
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition ofColleen Rheault

03/07/2018

~Notice
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum ofRob Raynor

03/07/2018

~Notice
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition ofPaul Duplissie

03/09/2018

fflNotice
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition ofCarol Jacques

03/14/2018

mNotice
Second Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum ofDP Van Blaricom

03/15/2018

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Leda Waddle
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated:

03/15/2018

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 03/15/2018 09:00 AM: Hearing Held to
be held Canyon County

03/15/2018

Pre-trial Conference (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
to be held Canyon County Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 03/15/2018
09:00 AM: Hearing Held

03/15/2018

ffl Stipulation
Pursuant to the Court's Order Setting Pretrial Conference

03/15/2018

ffl Court Minutes

03/26/2018

~Notice
of Taking Deposition ofScott Sloan

04/07/2018

fflNotice of Hearing
Entry ofCourt Order Governing Trial Proceedings

04/07/2018
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CASE No. CV-2015-954
fflResponse
Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion In Limine
04/07/2018

ffl Memorandum
in Support ofDefendant's Second Motion for Entry of Court Order Governing Trial
Proceedings

04/07/2018

fflMotion
Defendant's Second Motion/or Entry o/Court Order Governing Trial Proceedings

04/07/2018

~Notice of Hearing
Motion in Limine

04/07/2018

fflMotion
in Limine

04/07/2018

ffl Notice of Service

04/10/2018

mAffidavit
Defendant's Addendum to Second Motion for Entry o/Court Order

04/10/2018

~ Affidavit
ofBritainy Kingsmore

04/12/2018

~Motion
to A/law Use of Sloan's Depo and Rebut Witns by Phone

04/12/2018

ffl Affidavit
ofNathan Olsen in Supp. of Motion to A/law Use

04/12/2018

mReply
in Support ofMotion in Limine

04/13/2018

'mMotion
Renewed Motion for Change of Venue

04/13/2018

ffi Memorandum
Plaintiff's Pretrial Memorandum

04/13/2018

ffl Memorandum
Memorandum in Opposition Re Use of Deposition ofScott Sloan

04/13/2018

ffl Brief Filed
Defendant Payette County's Trial Brief

04/13/2018

ffl Notice of Service
Notice ofService

04/16/2018

Motion Hearing (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Defendant's Motion for Entry o/Court Order Governing Trial Proceedings and Motion in
Limine
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
04/16/2018

Iii Court Minutes
Motion Hearing 4116/18 held in Canyon County

04/17/2018

ffl Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiff's Jury Instructions

04/19/2018

~Notice
Defendant Payette County's Opening Presentation Exhibits

04/20/2018

fflMotion
to Strike Certain Jurors for Cause

04/20/2018

gJ Affidavit
ofNathan Olsen (MT Strike Jurors) Parts 1 - 2

04/20/2018

fflMotion
to Exclude Cert. Trial Exhibits ofDef

04/20/2018

fil Affidavit
ofNathan Olsen (Exel. Exhs. ofDef) Parts 1 - 4

04/23/2018

Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
04/23/2018-04/25/2018

JO days
04/23/2018

'3 Transcript Filed
Motion Hearing 4/16/18

04/23/2018

ffl Court Minutes

04/23/2018

ffl Preliminary Jury Instructions

04/24/2018

~ Court Minutes

04/30/2018

CANCELED Scheduling Conference (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Vacated
Telephonic

04/30/2018

QJ Telephone Conference (3:00 PM)

05/02/2018

'3Notice of Trial Setting, Pre-Trial Conf, Order

05/03/2018

ffl Court Minutes

06/11/2018

~ Notice of Service of Discovery Requests

(Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)

Notice a/Service (14th Suppl. Response)

07/05/2018

ffl Stipulation to Dismiss
with Prejudice

07/10/2018

fflorder

PAGE260F27

Page 27

Printed on 09/19/2018 at 2:26 PM

PAYETI'E COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2015-954
ofDismissal with Prejudice
07/10/2018

.Judgment
Final

07/10/2018

Dismissed With Prejudice (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Comment()
Party (Sloan, Scott Jacob; Idaho State Police Patrol Region 3; Raymond, Jacqueline Marie;
Payette County)
Monetary/Property Award
In Favor Of: Sloan. Scott Jacob; Idaho State Police Patrol Region 3; Raymond,
Jacqueline Marie; Payette County; Kane, Michael John; Elia, Michael Joseph;
Olsen, Nathan Miles
Against: Sloan, Scott Jacob; Idaho State Police Patrol Region 3; Raymond,
Jacqueline Marie; Payette County; Kane, Michael John; Elia, Michael Joseph;
Olsen, Nathan Miles
Entered Date: 07/11/2018
Current Judgment Status:
Status: Dismissal of Judgment By Court Order
Status Date: 07/11/2018

07/10/2018

Civil Disposition Entered

08/17/2018
08/17/2018

•

Notice of Appeal

Appeal Filed in Supreme Court

08/20/2018

•

08/30/2018

.Request
Respondent's Request/or Additional Transcript and Clerk's Record

09/19/2018

Clerk's Certificate of Appeal

Case Summary

09/20/2018

•

09/20/2018

•

Clerk's Certificate of Service

09/20/2018

•

Appeal Cover/fitle Page

Exhibit List/Log
Certificate ofExhibit

10/01/2018

CANCELED Pre-trial Conference (1 :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Vacated
Telephonic

10/15/2018

CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Nye, Christopher S.)
Vacated
i<'INANCIAL INFORMATION

DATE

Plaintiff Raymond, Jacqueline Marie
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 9/20/2018

129.00
129.00
0.00

Attorney of Record Olsen, Nathan Miles
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 9/20/2018

100.00
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Nathan M. Olsen, Esq., ISB # 7373

FEB 2 7 2015

PETERSEN Moss HALL & OLSEN

485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391
E-mail: nolsen@pmholaw.com

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. Clerk
By HALEY MYERS
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an
heir, and as Personal Representative of the
Estate of BARRY JOHNSON,

Case No. CV-2015~v

OC 15 03239

Plaintiff,
COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

v.
IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State
agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho, and
SCOTT SLOAN,

Fee Category: A.A.
Fee: $221.00

Defendants.

As and for cause of action against the above-named defendants, Plaintiff Jackie
Raymond alleges and prays as follows:

PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
1.

Plaintiff Jackie Raymond is an individual residing in the City of Nampa, Canyon

County, Idaho, and is the sole surviving offspring of Barry Johnson, deceased.
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2.

Plaintiff is an "heir" of Mr. Johnson ·within the meaning ofldaho Code § 5-311

and is the personal representative of the Estate of Barry Johnson.

3.

Defendant Payette County is a political subdivision of the State of Idaho within

the meaning of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Idaho Code §6-901, et seq.

4.

Defendant Scott Sloan was, at all times material hereto, acting in his individual

capacity and within the course and scope of his duties as an employee and Deputy Sheriff for
Payette County. Sloan's negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, and wantonness as
alleged herein are therefore imputed to Payette County pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat
superior and Idaho Code § 6-903 .
. 5.

Defendant Idaho State Police ("ISP") is a department and/or agency of the State of

Idaho within the meaning of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Idaho Code §6-901, et seq.
6.

At all times material hereto, ISP acted through its employees and agents, who

were acting at all times material hereto within the course and scope of their employment and
agency with ISP, thereby subjecting ISP to liability for their tortious conduct pursuant to Idaho
agency law and the doctrine of respondeat superior and Idaho Code § 6-903.
7.

The defendants have been properly and timely served with a tort claim notice

in accordance with Title 6, Chapter 9, Idaho Code, which claim has been denied.
8.

This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Idaho Code § 1-705.

9.

The amount in controversy exceeds this Court's jurisdictional threshold.

10.

Venue is proper in Ada County, Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 6-915, 5-402

and/or § 5-404.
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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
11.

On or about October 18, 2011, Barry Johnson was operating his 1983 Jeep CJ7

on Idaho State Highway 30 in an easterly direction, when he made a lawful turn into the
driveway of his residence just outside New Plymouth, Idaho.
12.

As Mr. Johnson was making his lawful left turn into his driveway, Defendant

Scott Sloan was attempting to pass Mr. Johnson on the left, at speeds as high as 115 mph
according to initial ISP investigation, a speed Sloan knew to be far too great for any evasive
maneuvers in the likely event he would need to avoid lawful action by other motorists like Mr.
Johnson.
13.

Sloan was personally aware that driveways from private residences and farms

lined Highway 30, and that pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists often entered and exited
Highway 30 from their residences or farms.
14.

By driving at such a speed grossly in excess of the posted speed limit and in

such a populated area with visible traffic, Sloan endangered life and property, drove without
due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway, and recklessly disregarded the
safety of others using highway, in violation of Idaho law and certain Idaho State statutes,
including but not limited to Idaho Code§§ 49-654, 49-623, and 49-625, thereby rendering
Sloan negligent per se.
15.

As a direct and proximate result of Sloan's misconduct, his patrol car collided

with Mr. Johnson's Jeep in an extremely violent manner and at an extreme rate of speed,
ejecting Mr. Johnson as well as the engine and drive train from the Jeep, killing Mr. Johnson.

3-
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16.

Based upon information and belief, Payette County was aware of Sloan's

propensity to speed, drive recklessly, and flout the very laws he enforced, yet failed to take
reasonable measures to reign hini in, and failed to develop rules and to properly train,
supervise, and control its Deputies, including Sloan, in the safe operation of patrol cars when
responding to a code call or pursuing a suspect, which was a substantial factor causing
damages to Plaintiff.
17

During ISP's investigation of the misconduct of defendant Sloan as alleged, and

prosecution of Sloan therefor, the defendants conspired and attempted to, and did, cover up
Sloan's misconduct and/or unduly influence the investigation, evidence, and witnesses
accordingly, in order to shield defendants Sloan and Payette County from liability and
responsibility for Sloan's aforesaid misconduct.
18.

The defendants engaged in an enterprise or conspiracy with Sloan to, and did in

fact, willfully and with full knowledge of Sloan's unlawful conduct, conceal evidence, harbor
and protect Sloan from criminal and civil liability, and intimidate, influence, impede, deter,
threaten, harass and obstruct witnesses and/or potential witnesses, all in violation of state and
federal law but in favor of a corrupt policy and effort to protect fellow Idaho law enforcement
officers from the consequences of their unlawful conduct.
19.

The defendants also thereby reduced the value of Plaintiff's claim and increased

the cost in pursuing the claim. Specifically, felony criminal charges were initially filed against
Sloan for the vehicular manslaughter of Barry Johnson, in Idaho District Court in Payette
County, Criminal Case No. 2012-566. After a preliminary hearing on April 13, 2012, before
the Magistrate Judge, the Court found probable cause to bind Sloan over to District Court to
4-
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answer the felony vehicular manslaughter charges. The matter was ultimately set for April 22,
2013. However, the defendants conspired to, and did, conceal and manipulate evidence,
intimidate witnesses, and otherwise interfered with the prosecution, thereby causing the
prosecutor to dismiss the charges. But for the defendants' cover-up and interference as alleged
herein, the matter would have proceeded to trial and Sloan would have been convicted. Such
conviction would have rendered liability in this matter res judicata. The absence of such a
conviction exponentially increased the cost of proving liability in Plaintiffs civil case, and
because of the defendants' evidence tampering has made it more difficult to prove Hability,
making Plaintiff's civil claim significantly less valuable than it otherwise would have been.

COUNT I - WRONGFUL DEATH
20.

Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 19 above as if fully restated

21.

Sloan's misconduct as alleged constitutes negligence, gross negligence,

herein.

recklessness, and wanton misconduct, and exhibits an extreme deviation from reasonable
standards of conduct.
22.

As a direct and proximate result of Sloan's misconduct as alleged above, both

individually and in his capacity as agent for Payette County, Jackie Raymond has lost the
support, care, love, comfort, society, and companionship of her beloved father, and caused the
Estate of Barry Johnson to incur special damages including, but not limited to, post-mortem
medical and transportation expenses, and funeral costs and expenses.
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COUNT II - TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ACTION
23. Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 22 above as if fully restated
herein.
24.

The defendants were negligent per se, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and Idaho Code

§§ 18-2604 & 2605, in directly or indirectly intimidating, harassing, corruptly persuading or
engaging in misleading conduct toward, witnesses or potential witnesses in order to influence or
cause to the withholding of their testimony or potential testimony.
25.

The defendants' wrongful interference was wrongful beyond the fact of the

interference itself, inter alia, because violated the aforesaid Idaho statutes.
26.

The defendants knew litigation was likely to occur as a result of Sloan's

misconduct as alleged above, and willfully destroyed or concealed evidence in an effort to
disrupt Plaintiff's case, thereby disrupting Plaintiff's case as alleged above.
27.

Such conduct resulted in disruption of Plaintiff's case, and damages to Plaintiff,

including but not limited to a massive increase in the costs of pursuing liability of the wrongful
death claims, a potential loss in the value of the claim, accruing interest from the significant
delay in resolution of the claim, and general damages including severe emotional distress and
humiliation suffered by Plaintiff.
COUNT III - (IN THE ALTER.J.~ATIVE)
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE ·wITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE
28.

Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 27 above as if fully restated

herein.
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29

Plaintiff had a valid economic expectancy known to the defendants in the form

of Plaintiff's claims and causes of action against Sloan and Payette County arising from the
death of Mr. Johnson.
30.

The defendants intentionally interfered with Plaintiff's valid economic

expectancy, resulting in the reduction, destruction, or disruption thereof.
31.

As a direct and proximate result of the defendants' misconduct alleged above,

Plaintiff's ability to obtain legal redress for their ittjuries has been significantly impaired.

INTEREST AND ATTORNEY FEES
32.

Portions of plaintiffs damages are liquidated as to the amount, and Plaintiff is

entitled to pre and post judgment interest on such damages at the maximum rate allowed by law
and applicable statute.

33.

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of her reasonable attorney fees sand pursuant to

applicable Idaho statutes and court rules, including Idaho Code § 12-117.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES
34.

Plaintiff reserves all right of and hereby provides notice of her intent to amend her

Complaint for a claim of punitive damages against all named defendants.
WHEREFORE,· Plaintiff prays Judgment of the Court as follows:

1.

For a declaration that defendants' misconduct was in violation of plaintiff's

legal rights;
2.

For an award of general and special damages suffered by Plaintiff as alleged

above and according to proof at trial;
4.

7-

For prejudgment interest on plaintiff's damages as provided by law;
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5.

For attorney fees as provided by statute and court Rule;

6.

For the cost of suit incurred herein; and

7.

For such further relief as the Court deems just and equitable under the

circumstances.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff demands trial by jury, comprised of the maximum number of jurors allowed
by applicable law, as to all issues triable to a jury in this action.
l'J J ~iii.-

DATED _~_clay of February, 2015.
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Michael J. Elia (ISBN 5044)
Brady J. Hall (ISBN 7873)
MOORE & ELIA, LLP
Post Office Box 6756
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 336~6900
Facsimile: (208) 336-7031

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PAYETTE COUNTY. IDAHO

FEB O4 2016
DRESSEN,CLERK
"""~.;..__ ___..,1EPUTY

Arror-,,eys for Defendant Idaho State Police
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an heir.
and as Personal Representative of the Estate of
Barry Johnson,

Plaintiff,

Case No. CV•2015-00954-C

DEFENDANT IDAHO STATE
POLICE'S ANSWER TO
COMPLAINT

vs.

IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State
agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State ofldaho, and SCOTT
SLOAN,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Defendant Idaho State Police, by and through its attorneys of record,
Moore & Elia, LLP, and in response to Plaintiff's Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

(hereinafter "Plaintiff's Corn.plaint"), hereby admits, denies, and alleges as follows:

FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim or claims against this Defendant upon which
relief can be granted.
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SECOND DEFENSE
Defendant denies all allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint that are not specifical]y admitted
herein.

THIRD DEFENSE
1.

This Defendant lacks know]edge or information sufficient to fonn a belief as to

the truth of the aJJegations contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of P]aintiff's Complaint, and
therefore denies them at this time pursuant to Rule 8(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.

The allegations contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint are

directed to parties other than this Defendant, and therefore no response is required. To the extent
a response is required of this Defendant those allegations are denied for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the matter contained therein.
3.

This Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph S of Plaintiff's

Complaint.
4.

This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 6 and 7 of

Plaintifrs Colnplaint.
5.

This Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
6.

This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 of

Plaintiffs Complaint. This Defendant admits only that the accident that is the subject of the

complaint occurred on October 18,2011 on Highway 30 near New PJymouth, Idaho.
7.

The allegations contained in paragraphs 13 and 14 of Plaintiff's Complaint are

directed to parties other than this Defendant, and therefore no response is required. To the extent

DEFENDANT IDAHO STATE POLICE'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT- p. 2
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a response is required of this Defendant those allegations are denied for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the matter contained therein.

8.

This Defendant admits that only Mr. Johnson was kiJled in the accident.

Defendant denies the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 15 of Plaintiff's Complaint.
9.

The allegations contained in paragraph 16 of Plaintiff's Complaint are directed to

parties other than this Defendant, and therefore no response is required. To the extent a response
is required of this Defendant those allegations are denied for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the matter contained therein.
10.

This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of

Plaintur s Complaint.
11.

As to the allegations contained in paragraph 20 of Plaintiff's Complaint, this

Defendant realleges its responses to paragraphs 1-19 and incorporates the same by reference as
applicable.
12.

The allegations contained in paragraph 21 and 22 of Plaintiffs Complaint are

directed to parties other than this Defendant, and therefore no response is required. To the extent
a response is required of this Defendant those allegations arc denied for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to fonn a belief as to the truth of the matter contained therein.
13,

As to the allegations contained in paragraph 23 of Plaintiff's Complaint, this

Defendant realleges its responses to Paragraphs 1-22 and incorporates the same by reference as
applicable.
14,

This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 24, 25, 26 and 27

of Plaintiff's Complaint.

DEFENDANT IDAHO STATE POLICE'S ANSWER TO COMFLAINT- p. 3

FEB--04-2016 14:02

From:

ID:N+T PMH+O

Page 39

Page:004

R:95%

reo. '+.

LVIO

15.

L: ILrl'II

No. U/IL

r.

'J/IU

As to the allegations contained in paragraph 28 of Plaintiff's Complaint, this

Defendant realleges its responses to paragraphs 1-27 and incorporates the

SalD.e

by reference as

applicable.
16.

This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 29, 30 and 31 of

Plaintifrs Complaint.
17.

This Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 32, 33 and 34 of

Plaintiff's Coinplaint.

Ali'FIRMATIVE DEFENSES
At the time of the filing of this Answer, this Defendant has not been able to engage in
discovery and lacks information sufficient to form a belief as to all affinnative defenses that
might apply in this matter. At this time, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, this Defendant is asserting the following affinnative defenses so that the same are not
waived. If factual information is not developed sufficient to support any specific affirmative
defense, the affirmative defense in question will be withdrawn.
The foregoing defenses arc applicable, where appropriate, to any and all of Plaintiff's
claims for relief. In asserting these defenses, this Defendant docs not admit that it has a burden
of proving the allegations or denials cont.ained in the defenses, but, to the contrary, asserts that

by reason of the denials and/or by reasons of relevant statutory and judicial authority, the burden
of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses, and/or burden of proving the inverse to the
allegations contained in many of the defenses, is upon the Plaintiff. In asserting any defense, this
Defendant does not admit any responsibility or liability, but, to the contrary, specifically denies

any and all allegations, responsibility and liability contained in Plaintiff's Complaint.
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FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
This Defendant breached no duty to Plaintiff's Decedent or Plaintiff.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Without admitting any of Plaintiff's allegations of responsibility, which obligations this
Defendant specifically denies, this Defendant asserts that any conduct on the part of this
Defendant or its employees was not a legal, actual or proximate cause of the subject accident or
injuries alleged.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Without admitting any responsibility on the pan of this Defendant, which this Defendant
specifically denies, this Defendant asserts the comparative negligence doctrine fmmd in Idaho
Code §6-801, et seq., as a complete or partial bar to Plaintiff's case.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Without admitting any responsibility on the part of this Defendant, which this Defendant
specifically denies, this Defendant assem that the accident described in Plaintiff's Complaint

was caused by the acts or omissions of other persons or entities for whom this Defendant is not
responsible.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff is not the real party in interest for all or a portion of their damages.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
This Defendant asserts the colla1eral source doctrine found in Idaho Code §6-1606.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff has failed to mitigate her damages, if any.
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EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The accident described in Plaintiff's Complaint was caused by or was the proxitnatc

result of intervening, ~perseding causes, over which this Defendant had no control, thus baning
Plaintiff's claims against this Defendant.

NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant Idaho State Police are barred by the public duty

doctrine.

TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff's Complaint is barred by the faHure to file, untimely filing, or insufficient

setvice of their tort claim, Idaho Code §6-906, et seq.

ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The damages sustained by Plaintiff, if any there were, were directly and proximately
caused by the acts and omissions of Plaintiff, the Decedent, or third parties not under the Idaho
State Police's control.

TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Idaho State Police Defendant is immune from liability under state law for claims
based upon negligent investigation.

THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The damages sustained by Plaintiff, if any there were, were directly and proximately
caused by the acts and/or omissions of Plaintiff and/or the Decedent.

FOURTEENTH All'FIRMATIVE DEFENSE
In regard to Plaintiff's state law claim, punitive damages are not available under the

Idaho Ton Claims Act.
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ll'IFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Idaho State Police Defendant did not have knowledge of any economic expectancy
with respect to Plaintiff, nor did Defendant wrongfully or intentionaJly interference with any
such economic expectancy.

SIXTEENTH AFFJRMATIVE DEFENSE
There is no state law claim for tortious interference with prospective action.

SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the two year statute of hmitations of Idaho Code §5-219.

EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
This Defendant has considered and believes that it may have additional further defenses
to Plaintiff's Complaint, but cannot st.ate with specificity those defenses at this time, consistent
with Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, this Defendant reseJVes the
right to supplement its Answer and to add additional affirmative defenses. or to file and serve
other reSponsive pleadings, allegations, or claims.

REQUEST FOR ATI'ORNEYS'

FEES AND COSTS

Defendant has been required to obtain the services of the law firm of Moore & Elia, LLP,
to defend it against this action and the allegations contained in Plainti~s Complaint, and are

entitled by law to recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the defense of this
matter. This Defendant alleges and hereby makes claim against Plaintiff for full recovery of its
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending this action, pursuant to Idaho Code
§12-121, 6-918A, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and all other applicable
laws allowing for recovery of costs or attorneys' fees by this Defendant in defending this action.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, this Defendant prays for judgment against Plaintiff dismissing
Plaintiff's Complaint against this Defendant with prejudice and granting Plaintiff none of the
relief prayed for therein; granting this Defendant its attorney's fees and costs; and granting this
Defendant such other and fmther relief as this Court deems just.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
This Defendant requests that this matter be tried to a jury pursi1ant to Rule 38 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this Lf~ay of February, 2016.

MOORE & ELIA, LLP
By_---3---=;:...-!--1-------=IL----1...--Michacl J. Elia, A
Idaho State Police
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

l/12day

I HEREBY CERTIFY that 011 this
of February, 2016, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
Nathan M. Olsen
Petersen, Moss, Hall & Olsen
485 ''E" Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Attorneys for Plaintiff

_ _ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
1Facsimile Transmission 208-524-3391
_ _ E-Mail: golsen@pmholaw.com

Michael J. Kane
Michael Kane Associates
4355 West Emerald Strecti Suite 190
P.O. Box 2865
Boise, ID 83701-2865
A"orneys for Defendants Payetre County and

_ _ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
iA(Facsiinile Transmission 208-342-2323
_ _ E•Mail: mkane@lctlaw.net

ScortS/oan
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MICHAEL J. KANE
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
4355 West Emerald Street, Suite 190
Post Office Box 2865
Boise, Idaho 83701-2865
Telephone: (208) 342-4545
Facsimile: (208) 342-2323
Idaho State Bar No. 2652

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PAYETTE COUNTY, IDAHO

OCT 11 2016
B

RESSEN,CLERK

"-"t:::11:-----..o.epurv

ATTORNEYSFORDEFENDANTSPAYETTECOUNTYANDSCOTTSLOAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETIE
JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an heir, )
and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE )
)
OF BARRY JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

v.
IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State
Agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State ofldaho, and
SCOTT SLOAN,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2015-00954-C
NOTICE OF HEARING

---------------)
TO THE ABOVE NAMED PARTIES, BY AND THROUGH THEIR ATTORNEYS OF
RECORD, AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant PAYETTE COUNTY will call up its Motion/or
Partial Dismissal Pursuant to J.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for hearing and argument before the above-

entitled Court, in the Courtroom thereof, located at 1130 3rd Avenue North, in the City of Payette,

NOTICE OF HEARING - P. l
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County of Payette, State of Idaho, on the 2s•1a day of November, 2016, at the hour of 1:30 p.m.
before the Honorable Christopher S. Nye, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.
DATED this 10th day of October, 2016.
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
BY:

- - ; ~ - ~ ~..
MICHAEL J. KANE
Attorneys for Payette County Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of October, 2015, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below and addressed to the
following:

Counsel for Plaintiff
Nathan M. Olsen
Peterson Moss Hall & Olsen
485 4'E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
[Facsimile: #(208) 524-3391]
[Email: nolsen@pmholaw.com]
Counsel for ISP
Michael J. Elia
Moore & Elia, LLP
P. 0. Box 6756
Boise, ID 83 707
[Facsimile: #(208) 336-7031]
[Email: mje@melawfirm.net]

/

U.S.Mail

__j_ Facsimile
--i.L_Email

/
U.S.Mail
~Facsimile
~Email

Courtesy Copy To:
Sheri McCain
Clerk to Judge Christopher S. Nye
Canyon Cowity Court
[Email: secsm@canyonco.org]

-:n~~~~
MICHAEL J. KANE

NOTICE OF HEARING - P. 2
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MICHAEL J. KANE
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
4355 West Emerald Street, Suite 190
Post Office Box 2865
Boise, Idaho 83701-2865
Telephone: (208) 342-4545
Facsimile: (208) 342-2323
Idaho State Bar No. 2652

OCT 12 2016
B
DRESSEN,CLERK
~....----------,PIJTY

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS PAYETTE COUNTY AND SCOTT SLOAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an heir, )
and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE )
OF BARRY JOHNSON,
)
Plaintiff,

v.
IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State
Agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho, and
SCOTT SLOAN,
Defendants.

_______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2015-00954-C
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT PAYETTE
COUNTY'S RULE 12 MOTION
FOR PARTIAL DISMISS

COMES NOW the Defendant, PAYETTE COUNTY, by and through its attorney of
record, Michael J. Kane of the firm Michael Kane & Associates, PLLC, and hereby provides this
Court the following Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss.

I.
INTRODUCTION
In addition to a wrongful death claim, Plaintiff seeks to hold Payette County liable for
tortious interference with a prospective cause of action and intentional interference with a
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT PA YEITE COUNTY'S RULE 12 MOTION FOR PARTIAL
DISMISS-P. I
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prospective economic advantage, by claiming Payette County violated certain criminal statutes
and that Plaintiff lost the opportunity to exploit a negligence per se theory as part of her
wrongful death claim. Plaintiff's tortious interference claims rest on proving that "but for"
supposed but unstated actions undertaken by Payette County, Sheriff's Deputy Scott Sloan
("Deputy Sloan") would have been convicted of a criminal charge, which would have benefited
Plaintiff in a civil action. Boiled down to their essence, Plaintiff's claims amount to demanding
money because she has to prove her wrongful death claim as every other tort claimant must - by
presenting evidence and proving damages. "If only" Deputy Sloan was convicted of vehicular
manslaughter, she would not have to prove liability. Because she has to prove liability, we are
told, she has been damaged.
Plaintiff's Counts II and Ill are stated in the alternative, and are something of a mash up,
blending negligence and intentional tort theories, and setting forth torts not adopted in Idaho.
Plaintiff's theories are based on several faulty underpinnings, and as a matter of law, fail to state
proper claims and therefore must be dismissed.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim only when it appears
beyond doubt that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle
the plaintiff to relief. Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 835 P.2d 1346 (Ct. App. 1992).
Findings of fact are not required for dismissal of a complaint under the rule. Bissett v. State, 111
Idaho 865, 727 P.2d 1293 (Ct. App. 1986). A party may not amend his pleading after the party is
served with a responsive pleading under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b).

I.R.C.P.

15(a)(l)(B).

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT PAYETTE COUNTY'S RULE 12 MOTION FOR PARTIAL
DISMISS- P. 2

Page 49

In the context of interference with an economic expectancy, "it is an issue of law for the
court to determine whether the nature of the act complained of could be considered wrongful or
not. In other words, the definition of what could be considered wrongful is a question of law.
Once the act is so defined by the judge, it then becomes a jury question to determine whether the
act was or was not committed as defined." Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 382, 146 P.3d 639
(2006).

Ill.

THE COMPLAINT
The time for amendment of the Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
('"Complaint.,), filed February 27, 2015, has expired by court order.
Paragraph 17 of the Complaint alleges that Payette County entered into a conspiracy to
cover up Sloan's alleged misconduct on the day of the accident. Paragraph 18 alleges that
Payette County acted in furtherance of this alleged conspiracy. Paragraph 19 starkly sets forth
the alleged facts that support Plaintiffs theory and is reproduced in its entirety.
The defendants aJso thereby reduced the value of Plaintiff's claim and increased the
cost in pursuing the claim. Specifically, felony criminal charges were initially filed
against Sloan for the vehicular manslaughter of Barry Johnson, in Idaho District
Court in Payette County, Criminal Case No. 2012-566. After a preliminary hearing
on April 13, 2012, before the Magistrate Judge, the Court found probable cause to
bind Sloan over to District Court to answer the felony vehicular manslaughter
charges. The matter was ultimately set for April 22, 2013. However, the
defendants conspired to, and did, conceal and manipulate evidence, intimidate
witnesses, and otherwise interfered with the prosecution, thereby causing the
prosecutor to dismiss the charges. But for the defendants' cover-up and
interference as alleged herein, the matter would have proceeded to trial and Sloan
would have been convicted. Such conviction would have rendered liability in this
matter res judicata. The absence of such a conviction exponentially increased the
cost of proving liability in Plaintiff's civil case, and because of the defendants'
evidence tampering has made it more difficult to prove liability, making
Plaintiffs civil claim significantly less valuable than it otherwise would have
been.
Complaint, ,i 19, pp.4-5.
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Ergo, states Paragraph 24, Payette County was negligent per se by engaging in intentional,
criminal behavior - bribery, tampering and intimidation of witnesses. Hence, states Paragraph
27, she is damaged due to a "massive increase in the costs of pursuing liability." In addition, the
lack of successful prosecution of Sloan caused "severe emotional distress and humiliation." In
addition, states Paragraph 29, Plaintiff had a valid economic expectancy (her wrongful death
claim) that was interfered with by the alleged conspiracy. 1
There are numerous issues that demonstrate that these counts must fail as a matter of law.
These are described individually below.

IV.
ARGUMENT
A.

The counts are based upon speculation.

The central claim raised by Plaintiff is that Deputy Sloan would have been convicted of
felony vehicular manslaughter and the conviction would have been available to establish
negligence per se, if only the prosecution had not been interfered with. It is transparent that the
interference claims are entirely based upon this speculation and conjecture, and as such are
incapable of proof. Speculative claims are universally subject to dismissal as improper.
To be clear, the County's argument is not based on the relatively common disagreement
among advocates as to speculative or provable damages. Rather, Plaintiff's claim, in and of
itself, is premised upon a hypothetical - that Deputy Sloan would have been convicted. Setting
aside the practical absurdity of the Plaintiff making such a conjecture, courts simply do not
countenance claims based upon such wishful thinking.

1

To demonstrate the porous logic of the claim, it is noted that only a conviction of vehicular manslaughter while
DUI is admissible in a civil case. Idaho Code § 18-4006. Plaintiff does not allege Deputy Sloan was DUI.
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Although usually discussed in the context of standard of review, it is a clear tenet of law
that "the plaintiff's case must be anchored in more than speculation ...." Mackay v. Four Rivers
Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408,410, 179 P. 3d 1064 (2008). This is in keeping with the common

law.

•'The jurisprudence of this state is to the effect that where the fact of loss is itself

speculative and based wholly on conjecture, an exception ofno cause of action will properly lie."

Central Louisiana Electric Co. v., Pointe Coupee Electric Membership Corp., 182 So.2d 752,
757 (La.Ct.App. 1966). "The burden of proving a cause of action is not sustained by evidence
from which a jury can arrive at its conclusion only by guess, speculation, conjecture, or choice of
possibilities; there must be something more which would lead a reasoning mind to one
conclusion rather than to another." McVaney v. Baird, Holm et al. 466 Nw. 2d 499 (Neb. 1991).
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously defined the term "speculation", stating:
The word "speculation" in relationship to testimony has been defined as ..the art
of theorizing about a matter as to which evidence is not sufficient for certain
knowledge." Black's Law Dictionary 125S (5th ed.1979). "An expert opinion that
is speculative or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is inadmissible because it
would not assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or detennine a fact
that is at issue." Id. (citing Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 979 P.2d 1165
(1999)). Expert opinion that merely suggests possibilities would only invite
conjecture and may be properly excluded. Elce v. State, 110 Idaho 361, 716 P.2d
505 (1986).

Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561,565, 97 P.3d 428,432 (2004).
Although Karlson addressed expert opinion testimony, conjectural and speculative
allegations have been universally dismissed by courts.
"More is needed to state a claim ... than factual allegations which are conclusory,
vague or inherently incredible" (Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. State
of New York; 300 A.D.2d 949, 952, 753 N.Y.S.2d 541 [2002] (citations omitted];
accord Matter of Abele v. Dimitriadis, 53 A.D.3d 969, 970, 862 N.Y.S.2d 182
[2008], Iv. denied 12 N.Y.3d 706, 879 N.Y.S.2d 52, 906 N.E.2d 1086 [2009] ).
Plaintiff appears to assert a claim of tortious interference with prospective
inheritance based upon her observations that defendants have made home
improvements and settled debts since decedent's death. Such speculative and
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conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action and, in any event,
New York does not recognize a cause of action for tortious interference with
prospective inheritance (see Vogt v. Witmeyer, 87 N.Y.2d 998,999,642 N.Y.S.2d
619, 665 N.E.2d 189 [1996] ). Similarly, plaintiff's factual allegations regarding
her belief that decedent left a will, that the will named either Stephen Bracci or
Hallock as executor of the estate, and that neither has fulfilled the duties required
of an executor are, in our view, too speculative and conclusory to state a cause of
action.

O'Sullivan v. Hallock, 101 A.O.3d 1313 (N.Y.App. 2012}.
Where a jury would be compelled to speculate upon various possible causes of an
accident "which may be as reasonably attributed to a condition for which no
liability attaches as to one for which it does, then the plaintiff is not entitled to
recover, and the evidence should not be submitted to the jury" (citations omitted).
Smith v. Wisch, 77 A.D.2d 619 (N.Y.App. 1980).

To establish proximate cause, a plaintiff must show a legally attributable causal
connection between the defendant's conduct and the alleged injury. The plaintiff
must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that
it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of
the result. A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the
matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at
best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to grant summary judgment
for the defendant.
Grinold v. Farist, 643 S.E.2d 253 (Ga. App. 2007).

Here, the Plaintiff's cJaims are based upon an unsupportable premise, which would force
a jury to speculate as to whether or not Deputy Sloan would have been convicted of anything, let
alone felony vehicular manslaughter. In effect, pinning hopes on a conviction is akin to betting
on the outcome of a contest. The California Supreme Court had a case before it in which a party
alleged a conspiracy to affect the outcome of a horse race, and asserted that a valid e.conomic
expectancy had been interfered with. The court rendered a thoughtful analysis on speculation as
applied to valid economic expectancies.
The torts of negligent or intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage require proof of various elements as a prerequisite to recovery.
However, as a matter of law, a threshold causation requirement exists for
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maintaining a cause of action for either tort, namely, proof that it is reasonably
probable that the lost economic advantage would have been realized but for the
defendant's interference
Scholarly authority and cases from other jurisdictions agree that an application of
the threshold requirement of probable expectancy to the area of contests in
general will usually result in a denial of recovery. Prosser has generally remarked
that "since a large part of what is most valuable in modem life depends on
'probable expectancies; as social and industrial life becomes more complex the
courts must do more to discover, define and protect them from undue
interference." (See Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 130, p. 1006, fn.
omitted.) Prosser, however, has specifically addressed the area of interference
with contests: "When the attempt has been made to carry liability for interference
... into such areas as ... deprivation of the chance of winning a contest, the courts
have been disturbed by a feeling that they were embarking upon uncharted seas,
and recovery has been denied; and it is significant that the reason usually given is
that there is no sufficient degree of certainty that the plaintiff ever would have
received the anticipated benefits."

Youst v. Longo, 729 P.2d 728, 732~735 (1987) (italics in original).
Payette County admits that the analogy is somewhat forced, but asserts that if one
substitutes the outcome of a criminal prosecution for the outcome of a sporting contest the result
is the same. There can be no sufficient degree of certainty of receipt of anticipated benefits.2

B.

Plaintiff has no standing to complain about the investigation or result of a
criminal case.

While Plaintiff, as the daughter of the deceased, certainly had an interest in the outcome
of the criminal case against Deputy Sloan, she was not a party. Prosecuting attorneys, as a
matter of law, are responsible to seek criminal charges and when appropriate seek dismissal. No
court anywhere has suggested that a third party can claim damages because someone else was
not prosecuted, or convicted. Yet, that is precisely what Plaintiff is doing in this case.

It should also be pointed out that Payette County has found no case where the issue has been discussed in the
context of the outcome of a criminal trial. This would seem to be because no one has heretofore attempted to
persuade a court that one should be given money because a prosecutor did not pursue a case to the satisfaction of
that person.

2
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In Paragraph 18 of the Complaint, Plaintiff lumps the Idaho State Police ("ISP") and
Payette County together and asserts a conspiracy to protect Deputy Sloan from criminal and civil
liability. Obviously, Payette County cannot speak for ISP, but it poses the following legal
question: when and where has a court found that it is inappropriate to protect oneself from civil
or criminal liability in the context of a criminal investigation? More to the point, what right is
violated or what duty is owed to third parties during the investigation and prosecution of a
criminal case? The answer of course is that no court has suggested that criminal investigators
must urge prosecution against all reason, prosecutors try every case, or defendants not defend
themselves, so that a third party may further an economic interest
Without a duty to Plaintiff, there can be no tort. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134,
90 P.3d 884 (2004). The allegation of conspiracy does not change the analysis. In Idaho "[i]t is
quite well settled that a conspiracy to commit an actionable wrong is not in itself a cause of
action." Dahlquist v. Mattson, 40 Idaho 378, 387, 233 P. 883, 886 (1925). Instead, "[w]rongful
acts committed by conspirators resulting in injury alone give rise to a cause of action." Id See

Hopper v. Swinnerton, 155 Idaho 801, 317 P.3d 698 (2013 ).
Simply put, while it is apparent that Plaintiff feels that Payette County should have done
more to assure a conviction, her displeasure does not transmute into a valid tort. She has no
standing to challenge the outcome as she has no right to control that outcome and no duty was
owed her.

c.

Count II does not properly state a claim.

In order to properly discuss Plaintiff's Count II - interference with prospective action - it
is necessary to analyze the genesis of the tort.
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The tort of intentional spoliation was first recognized in Smith v. Superior Court, 198
Cal. Rpt. 829 (1984). A California appellate court declared that "the primary function of the tort
of intentional spoliation is to compensate for the destruction of evidence even though the
probative value of the evidence is not known, because the accuracy of the facts related to the
evidence will never be restored." Smith, 198 Cal. Rpt. at 832. The Smith court analogized that
spoliation of evidence was like the tort of interference with prospective business advantage.
"[A] prospective civil action in a product liability case is a valuable 'probable expectancy' that
the court must protect from the kind of interference alleged herein." Id at 83 7.
Most jurisdictions have not been persuaded by the Smith rationale and do not recognize
intentional spoliation as a tort. There are nwnerous reasons that courts refuse do so. Primarily,
"[s]peculation is a prime concern in the context of a spoliation claim because ... it is impossible
to know what the destroyed evidence would have shown." Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield

Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Minn.1990). For a list of jurisdictions
declining to recognize the tort, and the reasons therefore, see O 'Neal v. Remington Arms

Company, LLC, 2012 WL 3834842 (D.S. D. 2012).
Six jurisdictions have recognized the tort of interference in a prospective action, but all in
the context of first party spoliation only. These jurisdictions are: Alaska, Nichols v. State Farm

Fire & Cas. Co., 6 P.3d 300, 304 (Alaska 2000) (acknowledging that while first-party and thirdparty intentional spoliation are tort claims, negligent spoliations are not); Connecticut, Rizzuto v.

Davidson Ladders, Inc., 905 A2d 1165 (2006) ("[R]ecognition of an independent cause of
action for intentional spoliation of evidence is necessary to fulfill public policy goals of the tort
compensation system."); Louisiana, Desselle v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 d/b!a East

Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 887 So.2d 524, 534 (La.Ct.App. 2004) (recognizing a state law tort claim
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for intentional spoliation of evidence, which refers to "an intentional destruction of evidence for
purpose of depriving opposing parties of its use); New Mexico, Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc ..
905 P.2d 185, 189 (N.M .1995) ("[W]e will recognize intentional spoliation of evidence as a
distinct category of tort liability."); Ohio, Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 756 N.E.2d 657, 660
(Ohio 2001) ("[S]poliation of evidence may be brought after the primary action has been
concluded only when evidence of spoliation is not discovered until after the conclusion of the
primary action."); West Virginia, Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560 (W.Va.2003) (granting
stand-alone tort status for intentional spoliation and third-party negligent spoliation, but requiring
that the spoliator "overcome the rebuttable presumption" that "but for the fact of the spoliation of
evidence, the party injured by the spoliation would have prevailed in the pending or potential
litigation").
In Idaho, the line of cases on the tort begins with Murray v. Farmers Insurance Co., 118
Idaho 224, 796 P.2d 101, (1990). The court discussed:
. . . a recent innovation in tort law which has been adopted in California and
Alaska. Smith v. Superior, 151 Cal.App.3d 491, 198 Cal.Rptr. 829 (1984); Hazen
v. Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986). These first cases contemplated the tort
of intentional spoliation of evidence, and the concept was expanded in another
case to include the negligent spoliation of evidence. Velasco v. Commercial Bldg.
Maintenance Co., 169 Cal.App.3d 874,215 Cal.Rptr. 504 (1985).
118 Idaho at 229. The court declined to adopt the "recent innovation." As can be seen, the
court noted Smith as the genesis of the supposed tort.
In Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171,178,923 P.2d 416,423 (1996), the
Idaho Supreme Court, in dicta, stated "for guidance in future litigation we take this opportunity
to opine on a possible cause of action ...." The tort was described as intentional interference
with a prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence. Id. It was not actually adopted in the
case before the court. Again, Smith was noted as the first example of the tort.
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No other Idaho case has been reported since 1996 concerning this tort other than in the
context of spoliation of evidence, and only in the context of a jury instruction. As noted in

Ricketts v. £. Idaho Equip., Co., 137 Idaho 578, 51 P.3d 392 (2002):
The tort of intentional spoliation of evidence has been alternatively identified by
courts as the 'intentional interference with prospective civil action by spoliation
of evidence.'" Id at 178,923 P.2d at 423 (citing Hazen v. Anchorage, 718 P.2d
456, 463 (Alaska 1986)). The Court also stated that it is closely aligned with the
tort of intentional interference with a prospective business advantage. Idaho First
Nat'/ Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 284-87, 824 P.2d 841, 859-62
(1991).

Ricketts v. E. Idaho Equip., Co., 137 Idaho at 582, 51 P.3d at 396.
The Ricketts court goes on and notes that "[t]he concept of spoliation requires a state of
mind that shows a plan or premeditation." Ibid.
A year later the Idaho Supreme Court expanded upon its concept of spoliation of
evidence, stating "the circumstances must indicate that the evidence was lost or destroyed
because the party responsible for such loss or destruction did not want the evidence available
for use by an adverse party in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation." Courtney v. Big 0

Tires, Inc., 139 Idaho 821,824, 87 P.3d 930,933 (2003).
To complicate matters, Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rpt. 829 (1984), the seminal
case that has been spoken about in all of the above jurisdictions, and followed in some, has
now been repudiated in California. This is best explained in Gribben v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
824 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 2005). The Indiana Supreme Court set forth the jurisdictions that began
to adopt some form or another of the tort following Smith (broken down into first party, third
party, negligent and intentional fonns), noted the disarray among the courts, and then declined
to adopt any form of the tort. In large part, the court relied upon Cedars-Sinai Med Ctr. v.

Superior Court. 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 954 P .2d 511 (1998), repudiating Smith.
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It is thus not surprising that an independent tort remedy for spoliation of evidence
began to be recognized. Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal.App.3d 491, 198
Cal.Rptr. 829 (1984); Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maint. Co., 169 Cal.App.3d
874, 215 Cal.Rptr. 504 (1985). In the subsequent intervening years, however,
California came to question and ultimately reject this approach. In Cedars-Sinai,
the California Supreme Court comprehensively addressed the issue, finding that
the acknowledged harms resulting from the intentional destruction of evidence are
"not enough to justify creating tort liability for such conduct," and declaring that
"(w]e must also determine whether a tort remedy for the intentional first party
spoliation of evidence would ultimately create social benefits exceeding those
created by existing remedies for such conduct, and outweighing any costs and
burdens it would impose." 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248,954 P.2d at 515.
The opinion then more fully discussed the dangers of "creating new torts to
remedy litigation-related misconduct" and of adopting "a remedy that itself
encourages a spiral of lawsuits." Id It also compared spoliation to other forms of
litigation-related misconduct, such as perjury, for which there is no tort remedy,
and expressed its preference for policies of evidentiary inference, discovery
sanctions, criminal penalties, civil monetary, contempt, and issue sanctions over
derivative actions. The Cedars-Sinai court also focused on the ''uncertainty of the
fact ofhann in spoliation cases." Id. at 518.
[E]ven if the jury infers from the act of spoliation that the spoliated
evidence was somehow unfavorable to the spoliator, there will
typically be no way of telling what precisely the evidence would
have shown and how much it would have weighed in the spoliation
victim's favor. Without knowing the content and weight of the
spoliated evidence, it would be impossible for the jury to
meaningfully assess what role the missing evidence would have
played in the determination of the underlying action. The jury
could only speculate as to what the nature of the spoliated evidence
was and what effect it might have had on the outcome of the
underlying litigation.

Id.
The California Supreme Court also noted and discussed other factors that it
believed weighed against the creation of a spoliation tort remedy: the "risk of
erroneous determinations of spoliation liability," "the indirect costs by causing
persons or entities to take extraordinary measures to preserve for an indefinite
period documents and things of no apparent value solely to avoid the possibility
of spoliation liability if years later those items turn out to have some potential
relevance to future litigation," the costs and burdens of "litigating meritless
spoliation actions," and the "significant potential for jury confusion and
inconsistency." Id. at 519-20.
Concluding that the "incremental additional benefits a tort remedy might create"
are outweighed by other policy considerations and costs. the Cedars-Sinai court
denied a tort remedy for first-party intentional spoliation of evidence. Id at 521.
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One year later, the same court similarly disapproved a tort remedy for intentional
spoliation by a third party. [Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 84
Cal.Rptr.2d 852,976 P.2d 223,233 (1999)].
824 N.E.2d at 354-355.
So, it appears that the tort has never been actually adopted in Idaho, but it has been
discussed in dicta, and now the underlying case for the dicta is disapproved of.
In Yoakum, the court added more dicta, in a single sentence guaranteed to create conflict
in future litigation: "[a]lthough not confined solely to the spoliation of evidence, a claim for
intentional interference with a prospective civil action must nonetheless allege and prove
conduct that amounts to an 'unreasonable interference' by the Defendant, taking into account
any recognized privileges that party might hold." 129 Idaho at 179. Surprisingly, the Court
cited Hazen v. Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Alaska 1986), following this remarkable
sentence. The Hazen case did not speak to any cause of action beyond intentional interference
with a prospective civil action by spoliation. If an intentional interference claim is viable in
contexts beyond spoliation, the Yoakum court offered nothing by way of explanation as to the
source of its dicta, nothing by way of example, no elements of the supposed tort, no
limitations, no defenses beyond privilege, and no way to know how to try - or judge - the tort.
Twenty years after Yoakum, the legal chickens have come to roost in Payette County.
Plaintiff, apparently seizing upon the clause ''not confined solely to the spoliation of
evidence," has alleged in Count II that: (1) Defendants were negligent by (2) "directly or
indirectly" (3) "intimidating, harassing, corruptly persuading or engaging in misleading
conduct toward" (4) ''witnesses or potential witnesses" (5) to withhold testimony or potential
testimony (6) thereby disrupting Plaintiff's case, (7) increasing costs to Plaintiff, and (8)
causing emotional distress and humiliation.
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In other words, Plaintiff asks this court to preside over a litigation in which Defendants
will be expected to defend against an accusation that somehow witnesses were kept from
testifying truthfully (presumably in the criminal case) and that Plaintiff will have to spend
more money than she otherwise might have had to spend in this case, and that she is entitled to
general damages because of it. Needless to say, this is not a claim of spoliation. 3
Defendants assert that there is no basis in the law to require a trial of such a facially
absurd claim.
1.

The Law Regarding Dicta.

The definition of obiter dictum (Latin for something said in passing) is a 'judicial
comment made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion. but one that is unnecessary
to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential." Black's Law Dictionary, 7'• Ed.
In modem parlance, the concept is usually described as dicta. Where a question is not
before a court for decision, expressions of opinion are dicta, Long v. State Ins. Fund, 60 Idaho
257, 90 P. 2d 973 (1939), and are binding on no one, Bashore v. Adolf, 41 Idaho 84, 238 P. 596
(1925).
Obviously, the Yoakum court's loose reference to "other forms" of interference beyond
spoliation (while discussing a "possible" tort) was dicta as the sentence did not remotely control
the outcome of the case, and in fact the appellants were found to have no valid claim in any
event. There is simply no way for Plaintiff to responsibly argue that a new form of interference
tort was created in Yoakum.

3

More discussion on the Count's spoliation claim will be found below.
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2.

Plaintiff can neither use negligence per se to establish intentional
tortious acts nor the cited the criminal statutes to give rise to a
private cause of action.

If in Idaho the tort exists, it has only been discussed as intentional interference by
spoliation. Plaintiff cites several criminal statutes in her Complaint and then claims that these
statutes establish the Defendants were negligent per se as to her causes of action. The initial
problem, assuming for the moment that Plaintiff can meet the requirements of establishing a
violation of the criminal statutes, is that negligence per se simply establishes the reasonable
person standard for conduct in a negligence lawsuit. The crimes alleged by the Plaintiff are
intentional, not negligent, actions.
"Negligence per se is simply one manner of proving a common law negligence claim."

Steed v. Grand Teton Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 144 Idaho 848, 853, 172 P.3d
1123, 1128 (2007).

"(I]n Idaho, it is well established that statutes and administrative

regulations may define the applicable standard of care owed, and that violations of such
statutes and regulations may constitute negligence per se." Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609,
617, 733 P.2d 1234, 1242 (1986). "In such cases, the court adopts as the standard of conduct
of a reasonable person the requirements of the statute or regulation." Steed, 144 Idaho at 853,
172 P.3d at t 128.
Plaintiff cites 18 USC § 1512 (tampering with a witness), Idaho Code §18-2604
(intimidating a witness) and Idaho Code §18-2605 (bribing a witness) within the section
setting forth the basis to establish her tortious interference with prospective action and tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage. As discussed below, these torts require
intentional acts involving unreasonable interference (with prospective action) and wrongful
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interference (with valid economic expectancy). It is impossible to establish an intentional tort
by proving negligence.
If instead the Plaintiff is claiming a private cause of action based upon violation of the
criminal statutes, federal and Idaho case law have already determined that a private right of
action under these criminal statutes does not exist. See, Ford v. Rawlinson, 2012 WL 3782455
(D.Idaho, 2012) (no private right of action in 18 USC § 1512); Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins.

Co., 129 Idaho at 176, 923 P.2d at 421 ("[a]s criminal offenses under Title 18, the Idaho
legislature has specifically provided punishment . . . there is no indication that providing an
additional civil remedy is necessary to assure the effectiveness of these statutes."). See also

Barnett v. Sequim Valley Ranch, LLC, 302 P.3d 500 (Wa App. 2013) (instructions to jury on
criminal perjury, witness tampering and witness intimidation unnecessary and confusing in a
civil wrongful termination case); Fullerton v. Florida Medical Association, 938 So.2d 587 (FL
App. 2006) (Under the absolute civil privilege extending to a witness's testimony, torts such as
perjury, libel, slander, and other actions based on statements made in connection with a
judicial proceeding are not actionable).
In short, while it is exceedingly unclear what Plaintiff is attempting to state on this issue,
to the extent she is trying to assert a cause of action for violation of these statutes, such must be
dismissed. To the extent she is trying to assert that a negligent act can establish the commission
of an intentional tort, such assertion must be rejected as a matter of law.

3.

There is no valid claim of emotional damage as a result of interference
with an expectancy.

In paragraph 27 of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges she suffered severe emotional distress
and humiliation as a result of the alleged interference. If, as stated in Smith, the purpose of
creating the interference tort was to compensate for the destruction of evidence, the question is:
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT PAYETTE COUNTY'S RULE 12 MOTION FOR PARTIAL
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how is that compensation calculated, and for what exactly? All of the above mentioned
authorities seem to be in agreement that the calculation is an economic one (albeit very much
speculative). No court has suggested that the damage is calculated by the alleged stress on a
plaintiff.
Plaintiff has not brought a claim of negligent or intentional of infliction of emotional
distress. Instead, she seemingly is asking for double recovery of general damages, first because
she claims she has to work harder than she otherwise would have to prove her case, and second
because she is upset about that.
There is no common law right of recovery for purely emotional trauma. Summers v.
Western Idaho Potato Processing Co., 94 Idaho I, 479 P. 2d 292 (1970).

Recovery for

emotional trauma cannot be had in fraud cases, Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 129 ldaho
211, 923 P.2d 456 (1996), or for breach of contract, Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357, 699 P.2d
1371 (1985). On the other hand, emotional injury is compensable in an insurance bad faith case
due to the "non--cornmercial" aspect of the insurance contract and the special relationship
between insurer and insured.

Walston, supra.

From this line of cases, it appears that in

economic damage cases, unless a special relationship between the parties exists, emotional
damage is not a source of recovery.
Moreover, in cases of negligent infliction of emotional distress, there must be an
assertion of physical injury. Walston, supra,· Neal v. Neal, 125 Idaho 627, 873 P.2d 881 (Ct.
App. 1993). Here, no physical injury is alleged. As to intentional infliction, there must be
distress so severe that no reasonable person would be expected to endure it. Davis v. Gage, 106
Idaho 735,682 P.2d 1282, 1288 (Id. App. 1984). Again, no such assertion is made.
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4.

An interference by spoliation claim is premature.

Much of the Plaintiff's Complaint reads in the context of expectancy based upon a
criminal conviction. There is enough in the Complaint, though not well stated, to imply a
spoliation claim in the context of the current civil action. Plaintiff does not say what physical
evidence she claims was destroyed, and does not say who destroyed it. The question then is
whether Plaintiff can bring a spoliation claim in the same litigation as the underlying wrongful
death claim. Put another way, Plaintiff has not tried her case to a jury. How can she state her
case has been affected until a jury renders a verdict?
To explain the point further, either the County is liable or it is not. In proving liability,
assuming there really was destruction of evidence, Plaintiff will be entitled to a spoliation
instruction. If Plaintiff prevails on the issue of liability, what possible economic gain does she
derive from a separate claim of spoliation? What is a jury supposed to do with the claim? Give
her more money because she had to work harder to prove liability?
If, on the other hand, the jury was to find no liability, then, and only then, could Plaintiff

assert that she lost because of the spoliation. Until such time, her spoliation claim is inchoate. A
tort cause of action cannot accrue until an injury is sustained or actual damage occurs. Idaho
Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 54 Idaho 765, 37 P.2d 407 (1934); City of
McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 696, 201 P.3d 629 (2008); Minnick v. Hawley Troxell Ennis and

Hawley, LLP, 157 Idaho 863, 341 P.3d 580 (2014) (a tort accrues when a tort is completed, an
event that corresponds with the first objectively ascertainable occurrence of some damage).
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With this in mind, it is appropriate to examine the litigations found in the states that
speak to the tort of interference in a prospective action by spoliation. 4

(a) Idaho.
In Yoakum, supra, the parents of the deceased brought an interference claim after
accepting an offer of judgement on the underlying wrongful death claim.
In Ricketts, supra, and Courtney, supra, the discussion about the existence of the
interference claim was in the context of a jury instruction. No separate interference claims were
made in the negligence and products liability actions.

(b) Alaska.
In Nichols, supra, the court found no claim of negligent spoliation existed in the context
of a claim against an insurer, separate from a claim of negligence against a third party tortfeasor.
In Hazen, supra, the court created the new tort on appeal after the plaintiff's case had
been dismissed, and did not suggest the spoliation tort should be tried at the same time that the
false arrest claim was to be retried.

(c) Connecticut
In Rizzuto, supra, plaintiff, in response to an argument that his spoliation claim was
untimely, withdrew his product liability claim and substituted an interference by spoliation
claim.

(d) Louisiana.

In Desselle, supra, the court upheld a district judge, who in a bench trial ruled that a
plaintiff could not recover for spoliation, where the plaintiff recovered for negligence arising
from a use of a defective gurney.
4

It bears repeating that all the below cases discuss the tort in the context of physical destruction of physical objects,
usually ladders or similar devices. Not a single case stands for the proposition that conversations with witnesses
imply interference.
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(e) New Mexico.
In Coleman, supra, a plaintiff sued her employer for spoliation in a case separate from a
suit for products liability against several manufacturers.

(/) West Virginia.
In Hannah, supra, the court discussed the spoliation tort in the context of a stand~alone
counterclaim.
(g) Ohio.

As ever in the law, one can always find something of an outlier. Ohio may be it. In

Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 N.E.2d 657 (Ohio 2001), the court stated that spoliation of
evidence may be brought after the primary action has been concluded only when evidence of
spoliation is not discovered until after the conclusion of the primary action. The court followed
its own law, set forth in Smith v. Howard Johnson, Inc., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (1993), in which the
court, devoting only a single dependent clause to the issue, stated "such a claim may be brought
at the same time as the primary action." The Ohio rule has been the subject of some debate. As
the partially concurring justice pointed out in Davis, "I agree with the majority's finding that our
use of the word 'may' certainly does not imply that such a claim must be brought at the same
time as the primary action. To the contrary, a claim for damages under Smith may-and in the
majority of cases most likely will-be brought after entry of the judgment in the primary action."
765 N.E. 2d at 660. The dissent pointed out that the majority's conclusion was "bereft of
substantive analysis." 765 N.E. 2d at 662. The dissent also pointed out the "precarious status
nationwide" of the tort, given the repudiation of Smith by the Cedars-Sinai court. Id., note 2.
Given that it is unclear that the tort exists in Idaho at all. and given that the seminal case
for the tort is disavowed, and given that the vast majority of states do not recognize that the tort
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should not be tried along with the underlying action, the spoliation portion of the claim should be
dismissed as premature.

D.

There can be no valid economic expectancy in one's own civil lawsuit.

Count III sets out an alternative theory. Presumably because of the failure to prosecute
Deputy Sloan, Plaintiff claims her economic advantage was disrupted.
To establish a claim for intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage,
the Plaintiff must show: (1) the existence of a valid economic expectancy; (2) knowledge of the
expectancy on the part of the interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing termination of the
expectancy; (4) the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the
interference itself; and (5) resulting damage to the Plaintiff whose expectancy has been
disrupted. Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 893, 243 P.3d 1069, 1081
(2010).

For purposes of this motion, the first issue is whether Plaintiff can assert a valid

economic expectancy in her own lawsuit against the County.
No Idaho case supports such an assertion, but one state has dealt explicitly with it and
was dispositive of the issue. In Fox v. Country Mutual Insurance Company, 7 P .3d 677 (Or.
App. 2000), the plaintiffs asserted interference with prospective economic advantage in their
own wrongful death lawsuit.
[T]he question before us is limited to whether the economic relationship alleged
in plaintiff's Complaint, viz.. "the economic advantages and relations contained in
the lawsuit of Fox v. Vincent," is a business relationship or expectancy for
purposes of the tort of intentional interference with economic relations. We
conclude that it is not.
Fox v. Country Mutual Insurance Company, 7 P.3d at 688. After quoting at length from Allen v.

Hall, 974 P.2d 199 (Or. 1999), which created the tort of interference with an inheritance, the
court discussed at length the reasons why no such tort existed with regard to one's own lawsuit.
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We recognize at the outset that a civil lawsuit represents a prospective economic
advantage. In any civil action for damages, the plaintiffs claim represents an
expectancy in a monetary recovery that is the object of the litigation. And, as the
Supreme Court noted in Allen, many of the commercial interests that have been
associated with, and are protected by, the tort of intentional interference with
economic relations are purely prospective in nature. . . . Indeed, at least with
respect to the nature of the economic advantage at issue, an expectancy in a
settlement or judgment in a civil lawsuit is no different from an expectancy in an
inheritance or a prospective commercial arrangement.
Notwithstanding that similarity, there are material distinctions between a civil
lawsuit and other relationships and interests to which the Supreme Court has
extended the protections of the tort of intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage. Because of those dissimilarities, we decline to extend the
tort into this context:

First, the essential purpose of the tort is to protect the integrity of, and
expectancies in, voluntarily-created economic relationships. Conversely, a civil
lawsuit is an involuntary relationship that is adversarial in nature. In its earliest
and most basic form, the purpose of the tort was to protect '1he interest of the
individual in the security and integrity of the contractual relations in which he has
entered." . . . As courts expanded the tort to protect prospective relations, it
encompassed "any prospective contractual relations • • * which would be of
pecuniary value to the plaintiff," see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B
comment c (1974), and which were uniformly voluntary in nature. See id.
("Included are interferences with the prospect of obtaining employment or
employees, the opportunity of selling or buying land or chattels or services, and
any other relations leading to potentially profitable contracts [including] a
continuing business or other customary relationship not amounting to a formal
contract."). Thereafter, courts began to recognize "intentional interference with
inheritance or gift," considering it as an "extension of the principle found in
liability for intentional interference with prospective contracts." Restatement
(Second) of Torts§ 774B comment a (1974).
Thus, while courts have expanded the tort to protect additional types of
relationships, its purpose has been constant: To protect the integrity of voluntary
economic relationships, both commercial and noncommercial, that would have
very likely resulted in a pecuniary benefit to the plaintiff but for the defendant's
interference. We further observe that the relationships protected by the tort are, by
virtue of their "voluntariness," the products of the parties' free and voluntary
actions as autonomous individuals. Thus, in the abstract, the tort serves the
essential purpose of protecting the basic right of the individual to conduct his or
her economic affairs autonomously, viz.. without interference.
Protection of a prospective interest in the outcome of civil litigation does not
comport with that essential purpose. A lawsuit is, by its nature, an involuntary
relationship. In fact, the only basis for the relationship between opposing parties
in a lawsuit is a dispute. The integrity of an actual or putative mutually voluntary
relationship is not implicated.
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Second, courts have not historically afforded prospective interests in the outcome
of civil litigation the same level of common-law protection extended to
prospective contracts or prospective inheritances. ... Although interests in
litigation are certainly afforded some common-law protection, e.g., legal
malpractice. we have found no reported decision from any jurisdiction in which a
court has extended the tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic
advantage to protect civil litigation ....
Allen represents our Supreme Court's furthest extension of the tort of intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage. Unlike in Allen, the
relationship and resulting prospective interest here was not voluntary and, thus,
the alleged interference did not implicate the tort's essential purpose. Unlike in
Allen, where other courts had traditionally and consistently protected expectancies
in inheritance, no reported decision has extended the tort to apply in this context.
Given those distinctions, we decline to go further.

In so concluding, we emphasize the precise and limited nature of our holding. We
decide only that plaintiff failed to state a claim for intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage. That holding is based on the peculiar character
and requisites of that tort. We do not address, much less purport to preclude, the
availability of other tort causes of action, including fraud, in analogous
circumstances.

Fox v. Country Mutual Insurance Company, 1 P.3d at 688-689. (emphasis added, internal case
citations omitted).
It is submitted that the logic and holding of Fox are applicable here. Obviously, if a
claim could be made for a valid economic interest in one's own lawsuit, then any defense action
could be subject to an interference claim. As demonstrated in Fox, that was not the intent when
the courts created the tort.
Even if the tort exists, Plaintiff cannot claim that her expectancy was terminated. The
word termination is defined as "the end of something in time or existence, conclusion or
discontinuance." Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Ed As demonstrated above, the elements of the
tort require interference inducing termination of the expectancy. Wesco Autobody, supra. All
Idaho cases on the subject are in accord. See Bank of Commerce v. Jefferson Enterprises, LLC,
154 Idaho 824, 303 P.3d 183 (2013) (appellant did not '"lose" an economic expectancy).
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So what expectancy has Plaintiff lost? It cannot be her wrongful death claim as she is
going forward with that claim in Count I. The only thing she can point to is the inability to
capitalize on a conviction. Again, this is based on nothing more than speculation, and wishful
thinking.

V.
CONCLUSION
So the question is - what should the court do here? The following rulings are requested.
First, the court should reject the notion that Plaintiff should be able to argue to the jury that she
was damaged because Deputy Sloan was not convicted of a felony, and any claim based on that
notion should be dismissed. Assuming any part of Counts II or III survive, the court should rule
that one does not have a valid economic expectancy in one's own case, thereby dismissing Count
III. Next, the court should reject that portion of Count II regarding interference based upon
allegations of influencing witnesses as opposed to actual destruction or concealment of physical
evidence. That portion of the Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. Similarly, the
claim that the alleged interference caused emotional damage should similarly be dismissed with
prejudice. Finally, the Court should dismiss with prejudice the portion of Count II based on
negligence.
The only remaining part of Count II is the spoliation of evidence claim as to the current
civil suit. The court must determine whether the tort even exists in Idaho, given that it has never
been officially adopted, and given that its fundamental underpinning (Smith) has been
repudiated. Despite the Yoakum dicta, this is an issue of first impression. The County asserts
that it is not a viable tort, as it is based primarily upon speculation. This has been the finding of
the vast majority of courts throughout the nation.
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If the court determines that the tort exists, it should dismiss it without prejudice untiJ a
jury verdict on the underlying case is reached.
DATED this

7#- day of October, 2016.
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
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BY:
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Attorneys for Payette County
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and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below and addressed to the
following:
Counsel for Plaintiff
Nathan M. Olsen
Peterson Moss Hall & Olsen
485 ..E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
(Facsimile: #(208) 524-3391]
[Email: nolsen@pmholaw.com]
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Counsel for ISP
Michael J. Elia
Moore & Elia, LLP
P. 0. Box 6756
Boise, ID 83707
[Facsimile: #(208) 336-7031]
[Email: mje(a),melawfirm.net]

I

Courtesy Copy To:
Sheri McCain
Clerk to Judge Christopher S. Nye
Canyon County Court
[Email: secsm@canyonco.org]
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Michael J. Kane of the firm Michael Kane & Associates, PLLC, and hereby moves this Court for
partial dismissal based upon Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
This Motion is based on the files and records maintained herein, along with a Memorandum
in Support filed contemporaneously herewith.
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FILED

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OOURT
PAYETTE COUNTY, IDAHO

N'OV 14 2016
BE

RESSEN,CLERK

5y__,_"11f&-----EPUTY

AttornE-y.\'for D~fendant Idaho Stale Police
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tint TIIIRD .RJDICIAL. DISTRICT OF THE
STAT:E OF IDAHO, IN AND ll'OR TIIE COUNTY OF PAY E'J"fE

JACKIE RAYMOND, inilividually as an heir,
and as Personal Representative of the Rstatc of
llat·ry Johnson,

DEFRNDAN'f IDAIIO STATK

POLICE'S JOINDER IN
Plaintiff,

PAYETTE COUNTY'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. l2(h){6)

VN.

IDAHO STATE POUCR, an Idaho State
agency, PAYETI'E COlJNTY, a political
subdivision of the State orrdaho, and SCOTI
SLOAN,
Defendants.
COMES NOW Dctbn.da.nt Idaho Stale Police (ISP), by and through its attorneys of
record, Moore & Rlia, LLP, and hereby suhmitci its Joinder to Defendant Payette County's
Motion for Prutial Dismis.':lal Pursuant to I.R.C.P. ·12(h)(6). ISP hereby adopts and joins in

Payette County's Motion and Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Partial Dismissal
Pursuant to I.R..C.P. 12(b)(6), nlcd October 7, 2016,
Plainlills have named TSP a.~ a Defendant in Connts 11 (fortious T11tc,1fc.rcnce with
Prospective Adion) and Count T1I (Tortious Jnlerlett.-ncc with a Prospective Economic
Advantage). TSP is not named as a Defendant in Counl Tof Plaintiffs Complaint. Therefore, by

Dltl<'ENDANT ll>AHO STATE POLICl.c'S JOINDER IN PAYE'rl'E COUNTY'N
MOTION l!'OR PARTIAL DISMISSAL PlJRSUAN1' TO I.R.C,P, 12(h)(6)- p. l
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way <.lf this Joinder, ISP is seeking ~U dismissal of Plaintiff's lawsuit. In addition tu the hricfing
set forth by .Payette County, TSP ~ubmits the following:
A. Phtintil'rs Claims of Tortlou11 Interference with Prospective Action and Tortious
Interference with .Prospective F..conomic Advantage arc attempt, to artfully plead
around the Negligent Investigation, which ni not recognized 1mdcr Idaho law.

Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that during the ISP peer mvicw process of the investigation
of lhe Octoher I8, 2011 accident between Deputy Sloan and decedent Ran-y Johnson, ISP
employees "conspired and attempted t.o. and did. cover up Sloan's misconduct/and or unduly

influence the .investigation" and "conceal[ed] evidence, harbor and protect Sloan from criminal
aml civH tiahility.'1 Complaint, ut 117. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants thereby reduced the
value of Pluinti1l's claim and increased the cost of pursuing the claim. Plaintiff goes on to claim:

fblut for the deJendants' cover-up and interl~ence ... the
matter would have proceeded to trial and Sloan would have been
convicte::d. Such conviction would have rendered lia.bility in this
roatler res Judlcata. The ahi1encc of such a C<mviction
exponentially increased the cost of providing liability in Plaintiff's
civil case, and because the def-eridants• evidence tampering ha!-!
made it more dil11eult to prove liability, making Plaintiff's civil
claim significantly les.'l valuable than it otherwhie would have
been.

Id. ,tt 119.
Under Idaho law, no tort exist.'! 1hr negligent investigation. Wimer v. State, 122 Idaho

923,925, 841 P,2d 453,455 (Ct. App. 1992); llagy v. State, 137 Jdaho 618, 622, 51 P.3d 432,
436 (Ct. App. 2002). Plaintiff's Complaint is an example of artful pleading, .in which lhe
Plaintiff attempts to phrase her claims against De.fondant ISP in terms thul. conlu.cie and obfuscate

the trne gravamen of the action upon which relief can be grun loo.
1n Wimer, lhe plaintiffs, two hunters, brought general negligence claims against Idaho

Fish and Grune employees for negligently investigating the illegal killing of an elk. 122 Idaho at
454. The alleged negligent conduct of th" Fish and Game omcers was their failure to examine

uml compare the tire 1read on the plaintiffs' vehicle with those at the kill site, and for failing tn
DF.FRNDANT IDAHO STATE l'OUCE'S JOINDRlt IN PAY.ETI'E COUNTY'S
MO'l'ION FOR PARTIAL DISMISS.Al, PURSUANT '1'0 l,R.C.P. 1l(b)(6)- p. 2
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disclose to lhe magistrate that the witness providing information was a suspected poucher. Id
The two argued that the acts of the officers "'constitule[dJ a wrongftd act or omission.,, that
violated the officers' general duty of care, but did not fall under the Idaho Tort Claims Act
malicious pmsecution, abuse of process, o:r discretionary function exemptions contained in I.C. §
6-904. Id.

The Wimer Court began iti; analyi,,is by recognizing that. the claims against the State can
succeed only if a ''private person or entity would be liable for money damages undci· the laws
under the state of Idaho." Id. The lTCA does not create any new torts that do not exist at

common Jaw or pursuant to statute. Id. Dismissing the plaintHls' claims, the Cotut noted lb.al
Idaho does not recogni:1.e the tort of negligent investigation. Jd.; See also Hagy v. State, 137
Idaho 618, 621, 51 P.3d 432, 435 (C..'t. App. 2002) (holding that brother's claim uguini;l city and
county for negligent il.1ve1>iigu.tion of his mentally ill si~ier's death was not a cause or action
recognized under Idaho law). Nor does Idaho allow recovery for general negligence in
investigating or prosecuting a crime, as "the policy lhat to hold investigators Hable for their
negligent ucts would impair vigorou.'I prosecution and have a chilling effect on law
enforcement." !ti. at 455. The Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs' theories of negligence und
negligent investigation fu]} ~horl on their own merit. Id. at 466.
In dicta, lhe Wimer Court also addro.qscd the plaintiffs' attempt to disguise thei.r claims
for negligent investigation as ones of general negligence. The Court begins by stating thal
plaintills failed to cite any ca.'le law from Idaho o:r other jurisdictlo.ns recognizing the tort of
negligent investigation, and "on the other band, recovery for negligence in h~vestigating or
_pmsecuting a crime ha.q been specifically denied in a number ol'jurisdictions." Wimer, 122 Idaho
1.tl 925. Summarizing lhe State's argument the Court wrote:
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[t]he state contends that notwithstanding the plainlifls' efforts to
phrase their c]aim against the defendants in terms of "neglig1:mcc,"
the true nature ol' the action is one for .malicious prosecution and
abuse of process, falling squarely within the exceplion to
governmental liability a11brded by J.C. § 6 -904 ... While the
argument of the state is persuasive and is consistent with the views
we ex.press here, we do not need to disCLL'IS it further. For the
reasons slat.tu), we have determined that the slate is entitled to
judgment as a matter o f'Jaw on the theories urbred by pla.inH fls.

Wimer v. State, 122 Idaho 923, 926, 841 P.2cl 453, 456 (Ct. App. 1992).
In this c1lse, the Plaintiff alleges that Defe,nwmt ISP engaged in tortious intetlercncc with
the Plaintiff's prospective action and economic advantage. J.,jke the plaintiffs in Wim,~r, Ms.
Raymond's actual claim is grounded in lf11 allegation of negligent investigation into her father's

car accident. Plainti:trs claims in this case arc tm ullempt lo plead around a claim ol' negligent
investigation, which is not recogni:1.eJ under ldaho law. As the Court recognized in Wimer, ff the
foctt1 taken together amount to a claim that is not recognized, t1uch as 1,cgligcnt investigation,

misrepresenting the real claim docs not. create a cogni:1.ahlc cause of action. Wimer, 122 Idaho at
925-6.

CONCJ,URTON
ISP respecllully requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs remaining claims of tortious
interference with prospective action and tortious interference with prospective economic
advantage agairu;t J)efendant ISP based upon the failure to state a cluim.

DATED this

l utS
,_ diy oJ'Novcmbcr, 2016.

DJ£.J.l'.l!:NDANT IDAIIO STA'l'E POLICF,'S ,JOINDER IN l'AY.l!!'fTF, COUNTY'S
MOTION l"ORl'ARTIAL DlSMISSALl'UMUANTTO I.R.C.11 • 12(b)(6)- p. 4
NOV-14-2O16 13:30
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of November, 2016, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing docwncnt, by the method indicated below, and
mldn:ssod to the following:
Nathan M. Olsen
Petel'sen, Muss, Hall & Olsen

U.S. Mail, postabre prepaid
~Delivered
_ _ Facsimile Transmission 208-524-339 l
_ _ E-Muil: nolscn@pm~olaw.&2m

485 un,, Street

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Attornitysjor Plaintiff

_ _ U.S. Muil, postage prepaid
. . _ I!and Delivered
~Facsimile Transmission 208-'.342-2323

Michael J. Kane
Michael Kane Associates
4355 West Emerald Street, Suite 190
P.O. Rux 2865
Doise, ID 83701-2865

E-Mail: mkane<gikt1aw.nct

Attorneys.for De:fimdant..,· Payette County and
Scott Sloan

/'L~

Michael J. Elia ~

DF,FF,NDANT H>AHO STATR roLICli'S JOIND'RR IN PAYE'r'J'E COUNTY'S
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ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS PAYETTE COUNTY AND SCOTT SLOAN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an heir, )
and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE )
OF BARRY JOHNSON,
)
Plaintiff,

v.
IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State
Agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State ofldaho, and
SCOTT SLOAN,
Defendants.

_______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2015-00954-C
PAYETTE COUNTY'S REPLY
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL

COMES NOW the Defendant, PAYETTE COUNTY, by and through their attorney of
record, Michael J. Kane of the firm Michael Kane & Associates, PLLC, and hereby provides the
following Reply Brief in support of its Motion for Partial Dismissal.
Plaintiff affects to find it "astonishing" that Payette County asserts that it is outside the
law of Idaho to premise a claim on the notion that because an employee of the County was not
convicted of a crime, Plaintiff is owed money. Yet Plaintiff provides the court with virtually
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nothing that demonstrates the numerous cases cited to the court by the County are either
erroneous or distinguishable. In fact, Plaintiff does not even attempt to address some of the legal
points made by the County at all. It is ironic that Plaintiff claims the County is "cherry picking"
cases when she fails to demonstrate how any of them are inapplicable.
To be clear, there is no question that an auto accident occurred and that Mr. Johnson was
killed in the accident. That is the crux of the wrongful death case. The question is whether the
Plaintiff can bring separate claims in the same action by stating as a given that the deputy
involved in the accident would have been convicted, and base her claims entirely upon this
unknowable and unprovable assertion. Facially absurd assertions (that the case was "open and
shut" and that criminal liability was ..indisputable") are not substitutes for substantive law.
Plaintiff devotes four pages of briefing on the law of speculative damages. The County
expressly pointed out that the problem with Plaintiff's claim is that it is not about damage
calculations, but rather that it is based upon a hypothetical. The County pointed out that any
claim, no matter how denoted, that would force a jury to guess or speculate is improper. Plaintiff
has failed to even address these cases, let alone show that they are wrong or irrelevant. Simply
put, litigation cannot be brought upon speculative, conclusory or inherently incredible
allegations. In the context of valid economic expectancies, this was the message of Youst v.

Longo, 729 P.2d 728, (Cal. 1987). There has to be a sufficient degree of certainty in obtaining
the supposed benefits of the expectancy. No reasonably responsible person would argue there is
certainty in any criminal trial.

Moreover, there is a significant question as to whether a

conviction for vehicular homicide outside of a case involving a DUI is even admissible in a civil
case.

See Idaho Code § 18-4006.

Even if it was admissible for non-law enforcement

individuals, it very well might not be here, given the different standards of fault required in law
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enforcement cases. This is so because gross negligence might be enough for a conviction, but a
higher standard of fault is required in civil actions. See Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407, 196 P.3d
325 (2008) (reckless disregard for the safety of others, not gross negligence, is required).
Plaintiff has not rebutted the point that the fact that the deputy was not prosecuted cannot
be a tort because no duty was owed to the Plaintiff. Prosecutors can, and do, move to dismiss
cases for any number of reasons. If there was truly any substance to Plaintiffs claims of
intentional misconduct by unnamed investigators, there are criminal laws that speak to the matter
that can be utilized by proper authorities. As pointed out by the County, the law is clear that a
breach of those criminal laws does not transmute into tort liability, especially as to someone who
has no legal authority to interfere in the process of decision-making or has a personal stake in
that decision- making. Hence, the County acknowledges the language cited by Plaintiff from the
Restatement 2d of Torts, but points out that the sections referred to speak to intentional causation
of injury. A person is not injured when another person is not prosecuted.
Plaintiff does not rebut the County's point that one cannot have a valid economic
expectancy in one's own lawsuit. The logic of Fox v. Country Mutual Insurance Company, 7
P.3d 677 (Or. App. 2000), the only case found that speaks to the issue, is unassailable. Plaintiff
seemingly concedes the points made in Fox.
Assuming plaintiff can somehow get past the aforementioned issues, the central question
remaining is whether there is a valid tort in the state of Idaho called interference with prospective
action, and if so whether the actions described by Plaintiff fall within the tort. If the answer to
both questions is yes, is the tort ripe for litigation?
The County took pains to demonstrate the gestation of the potential tort in Idaho, pointed
out that it was last discussed in any substantive way some twenty years ago in Yoakum v.
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Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 178, 923 P.2d 416,423 (1996), and pointed out that it was
discussed in the context of a possible cause of action but not expressly adopted or used in the
case. The County pointed that the tort bas been rejected in most jurisdictions, and that the
seminal case that started the gestation of the tort in California, Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal.
Rpt. 829 (1984), has now been repudiated. Finally, the County pointed out that in the few
jurisdictions that have adopted the tort. all were in the context of destruction of evidence,
whereas the plaintiff's claim was primarily based upon allegations of witness tampering in an
unconnected criminal matter. The County pointed out that in the context of the allegations in
this case, the issue is one of first impression.
The County went to these lengths because such an analysis was necessary for the court to
make an informed decision. It hoped that by shedding more light than heat on a highly complex
issue, the court could more easily pick through the legal minefield, and determine if the tort even
exists in Idaho, and if it does then give guidance as to its limits.
In response, Plaintiff has ignored most of the law cited, most especially that Smith, supra,
has been repudiated, and acts as if Yoakum, supra, is the be-all and end-all as to his witness
tampering claim, despite the fact that no other jurisdiction has adopted the tort in that context.
This approach is not at all helpful to the analysis.
Plaintiff cites the Ohio case of Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d
28, 29, 615 N.E.2d 1037, as recognizing and adopting a cause of action for interference or
destruction of evidence. However, as noted in the later Ohio cases, the courts have limited this
recognition to only destruction of physical evidence. Pratt v. Payne, 153 Ohio App. 3d 450, 454,
794 N.E.2d 723, 726-28(2003) ("After Smith, no court in Ohio (at least that our research has
disclosed) has extended spoliation to anything other than the destruction of physical evidence.")
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Plaintiff also relies upon a New Jersey case which has since been modified by its
appellate court. Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 166 N.J. 391, 766 A.2d 749 (2001), when reviewing

Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 251 NJ.Super. 113, 119-120, 597 A.2d 543 (App.Div.1991), noted that:
Although some commentators have interpreted Viviano and its progeny as having
created a new tort of intentional spoliation, Adamski, supra, 32 J. Marshall L.Rev.
at 332; Maria A. Losavio, Synthesis of Louisiana Law on Spoliation of EvidenceCompared to the Rest ofthe Country, Did We Handle It Correctly?, 58 La. L.Rev.
837 (1998), we do not read our case law that way. To be sure, Viviano identified
intentional spoliation of litigation evidence as wrongful conduct and also
identified a tort remedy for that wrong. However, that tort remedy was not novel,
but merely an invocation of the previously recognized tort of fraudulent
concealment, adapted to address concealment or destruction during or in
anticipation of litigation.

Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 166 N.J. 391, 405-06, 766 A.2d 749, 756-57 (2001). The elements of
the tort of fraudulent concealment are: (1) that defendants had a legal obligation to disclose the
evidence to plaintiff; (2) that the evidence was material to plaintiffs case; (3) that plaintiff could
not have readily learned of the concealed information without defendant disclosing it; (4) that
defendant intentionally failed to disclose the evidence to plaintiff; and (5) that plaintiff was
harmed by relying on the nondisclosure. Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., 266 NJ.Super. 222,
258, 628 A. 2d 1108 (Law Div.1993). Clearly then, Viviano has no application to this case for the
reason that the investigators in the criminal case had no legal obligation to disclose any evidence
to plaintiff.

Neither Smith nor Viviano can be used as support for a new tort for witness

tampering in an unconnected criminal matter.
Plaintiff further fails to respond to the legal points made regarding the Plaintiff's claim of
negligent conduct leading to interference. The point of the discussion was that one cannot use
negligence as an element in the performance of an intentional tort. Plaintiff admits that she is not
attempting to assert independent torts under the criminal statutes. However, she accuses ISP of
gross negligence in the investigation. If Yoakum stands for anything, which is very much in
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doubt, it certainly cannot be used as support for a tort of negligent investigation or similar
conduct.

It only discussed the "possible" tort in the context of intentional destruction of

evidence.
Plaintiff also fails to respond to the points made by the County that one cannot collect
money for emotional injury in the context of an interference claim.
So, as asked in the original brief in support of the County's motion, what is the court to
do with this steaming mess of a potential tort? Given the state of the law as of today, instead of
twenty years ago, it is fairly clear that the existence of the tort of interference with prospective
action is in doubt. Most of the courts throughout the country, including the state where the tort
began, have found that the tort is too speculative.

It certainly would be here, where the

allegations begin with a hypothetical to the effect that it was a given that the deputy would have
been convicted. But that aside, there never was a trial, so how can it be proven that (a) because
some unknown witnesses were talked to by some unnamed party, (b) a conviction was prevented,
so (c) Plaintiff is entitled to money? Viewed in this way, it is clear that Plaintiffs case is
speculation piled upon speculation, which is why most jurisdictions have declined to go down
the road the Yoakum court spoke about but did not go down. For this reason, the court should
reject Count II.
But assuming the court finds that the tort exists in Idaho, the court should not expand it
beyond intentional destruction of evidence. No court, anywhere, has gone in that direction.
Hence, all of the claims based upon anything other than intentional spoliation should be rejected.

If the tort exists in the context of intentional spoliation, is it appropriate to litigate it at the
same time as the wrongful death action? The County pointed out that if Plaintiff prevails on the
wrongful death action, there is nothing to litigate. Only if Plaintiff does not prevail, (and she
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would be entitled to a spoliation instruction if she can demonstrate real destruction) only then
might she have a real claim as opposed to an inchoate one. Once

again,

Plaintiff failed

to

respond to the County's points on this issue.
Putting it bluntly, why should the court clutter up a relatively straightforward wrongful
death trial with allegations that some unknown parties tried to help the deputy in his criminal
case? As far as liability is concerned, either the deputy was driving with reckless disregard or he
wasn't. Either Mr. Johnson was comparatively negligent or he wasn't. What does a second trial
on the issue of witness tampering in the unconnected criminal matter add to or take away from
the question of liability for the accident?

If Plaintiff can identify some physical evidence

destroyed by the County (not some third party) that goes to the issue of liability, she will be
entitled to a spoliation instruction. The thumb will be on the scale against the County. What
more could the Plaintiff want?
The painful truth is transparent in the Complaint and the briefing. Plaintiff does not want
to let the fact that the deputy was not prosecuted go. That may or may not be understandable,
but it has nothing to do with a comparative negligence calculation. There is simply no law that
will allow Plaintiff to keep pushing the issue in the context of trying an auto accident. It simply
makes no sense to try this very questionable tort at the same time as the trial of the accident.
;';

DATED this

,-3

a

,,.J

day ofNovember,
2016.
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

BY:_~---~-MICHAEL J. KANE
Attorneys for Payette County Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
,4',
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12._ day of November, 2016, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below and addressed to
the following:

✓-.

Counsel for Plaintiff
Nathan M. Olsen
Peterson Moss Hall & Olsen
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
[Facsimile: #(208) 524-3391]
[Email: nolsen@pmholaw.com1

✓-

L/

Counsel for ISP
Michael J. Elia
Moore & Elia, LLP
P. 0. Box 6756
Boise, ID 83 707
[Facsimile: #(208) 336-7031]
[Email: mjera.>,melawfirrn.net]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Email

~U.S. Mail
_.iL:Facsimile
_LEmail

Courtesy CoJ?Y To:
Sheri McCain
Clerk to Judge Christopher S. Nye
Canyon County Court
[Email: secsm@canyonco.org1

-tLEmail

MICHAEL J. KANE
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Michael J. Elia (ISBN 5044)
Marisa S. Crecelius (ISBN 8011)
MOORE & ELIA, LLP
Post Office Box 6756
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 336-6900
Facsimile: (208) 336-7031

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

PA'\'En'E COUNTY, IDAHO

NO 2 3 2016

Attorneys for Defendant Idaho State Police
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

JACKlE RAYMOND, individually as an heir,
and as Personal Representative of the Estate of
Barry Johnson,
Plaintiff,

vs.
IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State
agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State ofldaho, and SCOTT
SLOAN,

Case No.

CV-2015-00954-C

DEFENDANT IDAHO STATE
POLICE'S JOINDER IN
PAYETTE COUNTY'S REPLY TO
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO RULE 12
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
DISMISSAL

Defendants.

COMES NOW Defendant Idaho State Police (ISP), by and through its attorneys of
record, Moore & Elia, LLP, and hereby submits its Joinder to Payette County's Reply to
Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant Payette County's Rule 12 Motion for Partial
Dismissal. ISP hereby adopts and joins in Payette County's Reply to Plaintiff's Response in
Opposition to Defendant's Rule 12 Motion for Partial Dismissal, filed November 21, 2016.
ISP therefore requests the Court dismiss Counts II and III of Plaintiff's Complaint.

DEFENDANT IDAHO STATE POLICE'S JOINDER IN PAYETTE COUNTY'S
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO RULE 12 MOTION
FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL - p. 1
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J)
DATED thisd:2. day ofNovember, 2016.
MOORE & ELIA, LLP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

:J..J

_,P

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of November, 2016, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
Nathan M. Olsen
Petersen, Moss, Hall & Olsen
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Attorneys for Plaintiff

_ _ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Facsimile Transmission 208-524-3391
_ _ E-Mail: nolsen@pmholaw.com

Michael J. Kane
Michael Kane Associates
4355 West Emerald Street, Suite 190
P.O. Box 2865
Boise, ID 83701-2865
Attorneys for Defendants Payette County and
Scott Sloan

_ _ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
-✓
-----Facsimile Transmission 208-342-2323
_ _ E-Mail: mkane@ktlaw.net

v

DEFENDANT IDAHO STATE POLICE'S JOINDERIN PAYETTE COUNTY'S
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FILED

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PAY£T1£ COUNTY, IDAHO

NOV 2 5 2016
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq., ISB # 7373
PETERSEN Moss HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391
E-mail: nolsen@pmholaw.com

B

.ORESSEN,CLERK

-14~----EPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an heir,
and as Personal Representative of the Estate
of BARRY JOHNSON,

Case No. CV-2015-954

Plaintiff,

v.
IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State
agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State ofldaho, and SCOTT
SLOAN,

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS PAYETTE COUNTY'S
RULE 12 MOTION FOR PARTIAL
DISMISS

Defendants.

Plaintiff, Jackie Raymond (Raymond), by and through counsel of record provides the
following response in opposition to "Defendant Payette County's (Payette) Rule 12 Motion for
Partial Dismiss" as joined by the Idaho State Police (ISP) This response is supported by the
pleadings in this case.
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SUMMARY
Under this motion, Payette and ISP urge the Court to dismiss Raymond's tortious
interference claims - even accepting all of her deeply troubling allegations as true. Simply put,
nothing prevents this Court from allowing Raymond to pursue her causes of action against the
defendants for their direct role and conspiracy (as the case may be) to commit the willful and
extraordinarily harmful acts that damaged Raymond after the death of her father, Barry Johnson.

In many respects, the Court is faced with previously untried claims in the State ofldaho.
However, Raymond has based her claims on fundamental principles of tort as well as recognized
causes of action in Idaho, as well as other jurisdictions.

MATERIAL FACTS
The defendants' motion attempts to downplay or disregard the deeply troubling
allegations set forth in Raymond's February 27, 2015, Complaint. makes the following
allegations, which for the purposes oflSP's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion must be considered as if true:
11.

On or about October 18, 2011, Barry Johnson was operating his 1983 Jeep CJ7 on
Idaho State Highway 30 in an easterly direction, when he made a lawful turn into
the driveway of his residence just outside New Plymouth, Idaho.

12.

As Mr. Johnson was making his lawful left turn into his driveway, Defendant
Scott Sloan was attempting to pass Mr. Johnson on the left, at speeds as high as
115 mph according to initial ISP investigation, a speed Sloan knew to be far too
great for any evasive maneuvers in the likely event he would need to avoid lawful
action by other motorists like Mr. Johnson.

13.

Sloan was personally aware that driveways from private residences and farms
lined Highway 30, and that pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists often entered and
exited Highway 30 from their residences or farms.

14.

By driving at such a speed grossly in excess of the posted speed limit and in such
a populated area with visible traffic, Sloan endangered life and property, drove
without due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway, and recklessly
disregarded the safety of others using highway, in violation ofldaho law and
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certain Idaho State statutes, including but not limited to Idaho Code §§ 49-654,
49-623, and 49-625, thereby rendering Sloan negligent per se.
15.

As a direct and proximate result of Sloan's misconduct, his patrol car collided
with Mr. Johnson's Jeep in an extremely violent manner and at an extreme rate of
speed, ejecting Mr. Johnson as well as the engine and drive train from the Jeep,
killing Mr. Johnson.

16.

Based upon information and belief, Payette County was aware of Sloan's
propensity to speed, drive recklessly, and flout the very laws he enforced, yet
failed to take reasonable measures to reign him in, and failed to develop rules and
to properly train, supervise, and control its Deputies, including Sloan, in the safe
operation of patrol cars when responding to a code call or pursuing a suspect,
which was a substantial factor causing damages to Plaintiff.

17.

During ISP's investigation of the misconduct of defendant Sloan as alleged, and
prosecution of Sloan therefor, the defendants conspired and attempted to, and did,
cover up Sloan's misconduct and/or unduly influence the investigation, evidence,
and witnesses accordingly, in order to shield defendants Sloan and Payette County
from liability and responsibility for Sloan's aforesaid misconduct.

18.

The defendants engaged in an enterprise or conspiracy with Sloan to, and did in
fact, willfully and with full knowledge of Sloan's unlawful conduct, conceal
evidence, harbor and protect Sloan from criminal and civil liability, and
intimidate, influence, impede, deter, threaten, harass and obstruct witnesses and/or
potential witnesses, all in violation of state and federal law but in favor of a
corrupt policy and effort to protect fellow Idaho law enforcement officers from the
consequences of their unlawful conduct.

19.

The defendants also thereby reduced the value of Plaintiff's claim and increased
the cost in pursuing the claim. Specifically, felony criminal charges were initially
filed against Sloan for the vehicular manslaughter of Bany Johnson, in Idaho
District Court in Payette County, Criminal Case No. 2012-566. After a
preliminary hearing on April 13, 2012, before the Magistrate Judge, the Court
found probable cause to bind Sloan over to District Court to answer the felony
vehicular manslaughter charges. The matter was ultimately set for April 22, 2013.
However, the defendants conspired to, and did, conceal and manipulate evidence,
intimidate witnesses, and otherwise interfered with the prosecution, thereby
causing the prosecutor to dismiss the charges. But for the defendants' cover-up
and interference as alleged herein, the matter would have proceeded to trial and
Sloan would have been convicted. Such conviction would have rendered liability
in this matter res judicata. The absence of such a conviction exponentially
increased the cost of proving liability in Plaintiff's civil case, and because of the
defendants' evidence tampering has made it more difficult to prove liability,
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making Plaintitrs civil claim significantly less valuable than it otherwise would
have been.

COUNT II - TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ACTION
24.

The defendants were negligent per se, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and Idaho
Code§§ 18-2604 & 2605, in directly or indirectly intimidating, harassing,
corruptly persuading or engaging in misleading conduct toward, witnesses or
potential witnesses in order to influence or cause to the withholding of their
testimony or potential testimony.

25.

The defendants' wrongful interference was wrongful beyond the fact of the
interference itself, inter alia, because violated the aforesaid Idaho statutes.

26.

The defendants knew litigation was likely to occur as a result of Sloan's
misconduct as alleged above, and willfully destroyed or concealed evidence in an
effort to disrupt Plaintiffs case, thereby disrupting Plaintiffs case as alleged
above.

27.

Such conduct resulted in disruption of Plaintiffs case, and damages to Plaintiff,
including but not limited to a massive increase in the costs of pursuing liability of
the wrongful death claims, a potential loss in the value of the claim, accruing
interest from the significant delay in resolution of the claim, and general damages
including severe emotional distress and humiliation suffered by Plaintiff.

COUNT III - (IN THE ALTERNATIVE)
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE
28.

Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 27 above as if fully restated
herein.

29.

Plaintiff had a valid economic expectancy known to the defendants in the form of
Plaintiffs claims and causes of action against Sloan and Payette County arising
from the death of Mr. Johnson.

30.

The defendants intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs valid economic
expectancy, resulting in the reduction, destruction, or disruption thereof.

31.

As a direct and proximate result of the defendants' misconduct alleged above,
Plaintiffs ability to obtain legal redress for their injuries has been significantly
impaired.
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ARGUMENT
A.

The Totality of Raymond's Allegations of Intentional Misconduct and/or Gross
Negligence by the Defendants Easily Justify a Tort Claim.

When ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must "accept all factual allegations in
the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Mosvesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 629 F.3d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 2010)( citations
omitted.) Every reasonable intendment will be made to sustain a complaint against a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535,835 P.2d 1346 (Ct. App. 1992).

In their Rule 12 Motion, the defendants (in particular Payette) attempt to parse out,
diminish and even disregard the allegations and claims made by Raymond in her complaint. For
instance, Payette attempts to "boil down" Raymond's claim to: "because she has to prove
liability (in a wrongful death suit) she has been damaged." (Mem. Supp. MTD p. 2) Similarly,
the ISP characterizes Raymond's allegations against it as merely "negligent investigation." (ISP
Joinder pp. 2-3.) They then scour jurisdictions throughout the country to cherry pick various
appellate decisions with entirely different facts and claims, in an attempt to deprive Raymond her
day in court.
Raymond's complaint in its entirety, if taken as true, describes a deeply troubling pattern
of conduct that clearly warrants a triable claim. In essence, the complaint alleges that the
defendants-who were charged with the fiduciary duty to investigate the death of Raymond's
father Mr. Johnson and help make anyone who was wrongfully responsible for his death
accountable - instead engaged in a concerted effort and conspiracy to protect the person
wrongfully responsible for Mr. Johnson's death (Scott Sloan). Such conduct included far more
than a sub-par investigation and even spoliation of evidence, but alleged that the defendants did:
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conceal evidence, harbor and protect Sloan from criminal and civil liability, and
intimidate, influence, impede, deter, threaten, harass and obstruct witnesses and/or
potential witnesses, all in violation of state and federal law but in favor of a corrupt
policy and effort to protect fellow Idaho law enforcement officers from the consequences
of their unlawful conduct...(and that such conduct constituted a violation of) 18 U.S.C. §
1512 and Idaho Code§§ 18-2604 & 2605, in directly or indirectly intimidating, harassing,
corruptly persuading or engaging in misleading conduct toward, witnesses or potential
witnesses in order to influence or cause to the withholding of their testimony or potential
testimony... (Complain par's 18 and 24.)
The complaint also alleges that such egregious conduct not only "would have rendered
liability in this matter res judicata, " but also resulted in "a massive increase in the costs of
pursuing liability of the wrongful death claims, a potential loss in the value of the claim, accruing
interest from the significant delay in resolution of the claim, and general damages including
severe emotional distress and humiliation suffered by Plaintiff." (Complaint par's 19 and 27)
Given the extremely high bar that must be met under a Rule 12(b) motion, i.e. that all of
the allegations are to be taken as true and construed in most favorable light against the moving
party - it is nothing short of astonishing that defendants seek the dismissal of Raymond's claims.
In other words, the defendants are suggesting to the Court that Raymond has no claim even if the
defendants engaged in the illegal conduct alleged therein and the resulting harms to Raymond.
They audaciously suggest that Raymond has no recourse for the devastating consequences of the
defendants' egregious actions in this case.
Indeed, the Second Restatement of Torts which is oft relied upon by the Idaho Supreme
Court as authority does contain a "catch all" provision that allows for liability when there has
been an "intentional act" causing harm that does not necessarily fall within a "traditional
category of tort liability:"
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§ 870 Liability for Intended Consequences - General Principle

One who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to the other for that
injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances.
This liability may be imposed although the actor's conduct does not come within a
traditional category of tort liability.

Rest. Torts, 2"'1 § 870. (See Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 178, 923 P.2d
416,423 (1996)(discussed at length supra in Section B.)
The "comment" after the rule explains its well-founded purpose:

Nature ofSection. This Section is intended to supply a generalization for tortious
conduct involving harm intentionally inflected. Generalizations have long existed for
negligence liability, involving conduct producing unreasonable risk of harm to others
(See §§ 282, 291-294), and for strict liability, involving the carrying on of an activity that
is abnormally dangerous (See§§ 519-520). As for conduct intentionally causing harm,
however, it has traditionally been assumed that the several established intentional torts
developed separately and independently and not in accordance with any unifying
principle. This Section purports to supply that unifying principle and to explain the basis
for the development of the more recently created intentional torts. More than that, it is
intended to serve as a guide for determining when liability should be imposed for harm
that was intentionally inflicted, even though the conduct does not come within the
requirements of one of the well established an named intentional torts.
Id. Comment "a."
Additionally, the Restatement of Torts further suggests that such a tort could extend as
well to "intentional harm to a property interest:"
§ 871. Intentional Harm to a Property Interest.

One who intentionally deprives another of his legally protected property interest or causes
injury to the interest is subject to liability to the other if his conduct is generally culpable
and not justifiable under the circumstances.

Rest. Torts, 2"d § 871.
Additionally, Raymond's claims clearly fit within the definitions of"gross negligence"
and "reckless, willful and wanton conduct" actionable under the Idaho Tort Claims Act.
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These terms are defined as:
1.

"Gross negligence" is the doing or failing to do an act which a reasonable person
in a similar situation and of similar responsibility would, with a minimum of
contemplation, be inescapably drawn to recognize his or her duty to do or not do
such act and that failing that duty shows deliberate indifference to the harmful
consequences to others.

2.

"Reckless, willful and wanton conduct" is present only when a person
intentionally and knowingly does or fails to do an act creating unreasonable risk
of harm to another, and which involves a high degree of probability that such
harm will result.

IC§ 6-904C.
Certainly, Raymond's allegations suggest a "deliberate indifference" and/or an intentional act or
failure to act creating an "unreasonable risk" to Raymond's interests -yet adding additional basis
for her claims.
Of further note, as an element to these claims, Raymond alleges that defendants violated a
number of criminal statutes with regard to witness tampering and intimidation, destruction of
evidence, harassment under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and Idaho Code§§ 18-2604 & 2605. These
allegations, if true, add an additional layer of egregious conduct that warrant a claim of
wrongdoing. Again, Raymond is not necessarily relying upon the statutes themselves as a
separate "cause of action," but rather to expand upon the already deeply serious allegations that
she has made to support a tort claim against the defendants, (and perhaps a claim for punitive
damages or other non-economic damages.)
Because Raymond has quite clearly alleged unjustifiable conduct that was intentionally
injurious or harmful to her as well as her "property" interests (i.e the wrongful death claims) the
Court need not follow some pre-established ''tort" to fit the allegations in order for Raymond to
be able to try her claims. Rather, the Court simply can rely upon the "unifying principle" set
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forth in§ 870 of the Restatement of Torts, and thus allow Raymond to proceed with her claims.
Again, given the gravity and extensiveness of the allegations, the Court should allow the creation
or recognition of a tort to allow relief for the wrongs that have been committed, rather than find
ways to deny such justice.

B.

Defendants are Potentially Liability under a Tortious Interference of a Prospective
Cause of Action/Economic Advantage.
Nevertheless, pursuant to the arguments set forth supra, there are established and

recognized torts in the State ofldaho that could easily fit within many of the allegations set forth
by Raymond. This is certainly the case under Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171,
178, 923 P.2d 416,423 (1996). Payette attempts to pass the holdings in Yoakum off as "dicta"
that the Court should pay no heed. However, the Supreme Court's guidance in the case clearly
goes well beyond "dicta" to establishing a recognized tort. In Yoakum, the Supreme Court
acknowledges § 870 and 871 of the Restatement of Torts as a basis for the possibility of torts
"not previously recognized in this state, i.e. liability for intended consequences and intentional
harm to a property interest, based upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 870, 871 (1979)."

Id.
Although the Yoakum Court did not craft a tort under the Restatement in that particular
case, it did indicate that:
however, for guidance in future litigation we take this opportunity to opine on a
possible cause of action for conduct more eareaious than that presented here. The
guidelines offered by the authors of the Restatement and the cases which have defined
the intentional spoliation of evidence cause of action provide a framework for
another cause of action based upon intentional conduct that unreasonably interferes
with a party's prospective cause of action. The tort of intentional spoliation of evidence
has been alternatively identified by courts as the "intentional interference with
prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence." The court in Smith described this tort
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as "closely analogous" to the intentional interference with a prospective business
advantage, a tort which has been recognized in this state. Idaho First National Bank v.
Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 284-87, 824 P.2d 841, 859-62 (1991).
(Id. emphasis added)
The Court then provides the element for such a cause of action as being similar to a "prospective
economic advantage" , i.e. that
a plaintiff must establish that the intentional interference by the defendant resulting in
injury was wrongful. This may be shown by proof that either: (1) the defendant had an
improper motive to harm the plaintiff; or (2) the defendant used a wrongful means to
cause injury to the prospective advantage.

Id.
Again, this direction by the Idaho Supreme Court is not dicta, but rather "opines" on a
''possible conduct of action" for "future litigation" and additionally - even provides potential
elements for such a claim. It simply would be an error by this Court to disregard the direction
provided by the Idaho Supreme Court.
Idaho is certainly not alone in recognizing such a claim. The Supreme Court of Ohio
recognized a "a cause of action exists in tort for interference with or destruction of evidence"
with the following elements:

(1) pending or probable litigation involving the plaintiff,
(2) knowledge on the part of defendant that litigation exists or is probable,
(3) willful destruction of evidence by defendant designed to disrupt the plaintiffs case,
(4) disruption of the plaintiffs case, and
(5) damages proximately caused by the defendant's acts;
such a claim should be recognized between the parties to the primary action and against
third parties; and such a claim may be brought at the same time as the primary action."

Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc., 67 Ohio St.3d 28, 29m 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038,
1993-Ohio-229, 230 (1993)
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The State of New Jersey also recognizes this type of claim, again, along the lines of
"interference with prospective economic advantage for the ''willful destruction or concealment of
evidence." Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 251 NJ.Super. 113, 125-26, 597 A.2d 543, 549-50 (1991). In

Viviano, which involved the defendants' fraudulent concealment of documents that contained
"key information" with regard to the liability of the defendants, the court opined as to the sound
and apparent policy reasons justifying such a claim:
Immunizing the willful destruction or concealment of evidence would not further the
policy of encouraging testimonial candor. As the court explained in Petrik v. Monarch
Printing Corp.,This state's system of civil litigation is founded in large part on a litigant's
ability under the authority of the Supreme Court rules, to investigate and uncover
evidence after filing suit. Destruction of evidence known to be relevant to pending
litigation violates the spirit of liberal discovery. Intentional destruction of evidence
manifests a shocking disregard for orderly judicial procedures and offends traditional
notions of fair play.

Id 251 N.J. Super. at 121, 126, 127,(1991) (citations omitted)
Again, a substantial (but not complete) part of Raymond's claims include the defendants'
concealing and tampering of evidence that ultimately affected, or "interfered" with her wrongful
death claim and caused other damages. Again, this is a recognized claim in the State of Idaho,
and should be allowed in this case.

C.

ISP's Conduct is Not "Negligent Investigation" but Rather Gross Negligence or
Reckless, Willful and Wanton Conduct Actionable under the Idaho Tort Claims
Act.
All of the arguments set forth in Sections A-B herein apply to the ISP's recent "joinder"

to Payette's motion. However, ISP makes a separate argument that is wholly without merit, i.e.
that Raymond's claims are merely a "disguised" caused of action for "negligent investigation"
which is not a recognized tort in Idaho.
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ISP's memorandum cites two Idaho Court of Appeals decisions in support of this notion,

Wimer v. State, 122 Idaho 923 (Ct. App. 1992) and Hagy v. State, 137 Idaho 618 (Ct App. 2002).
However the facts and holdings in these respective decisions bear no resemblance to the deeply
serious claims being made by Raymond against the Idaho State Police. In Wimer the Idaho Court
of Appeals rejected a claim by the plaintiffs that the Idaho Fish and Game had "negligently"
investigated game hunting violations after the plaintiffs had been acquitted of such charges.

Wimer v. State, 122 Idaho at 923-24, 841 P.2d at 453-54. The Wimer Court held that the
plaintiffs' claims could not succeed because "a private person or entity" would "not be liable" for
the "negligent investigation of a crime" and therefore not a proper tort claim. Id.

In this case, Raymond is not claiming that ISP ''negligently investigated a crime," but
rather, among other disturbing allegations, is claiming that the ISP "engaged in an enterprise or
conspiracy with Sloan to, and did in fact willfully and with full knowledge of Sloan's unlawful
conduct, conceal evidence, harbor and protect Sloan from criminal and civil liability, and
intimidate, influence, impede, deter, threaten, harass and obstruct witnesses and/or potential
witnesses, all in violation of state and federal law but in favor of a corrupt policy and effort to
protect fellow Idaho law enforcement officers from the consequences of their unlawful conduct."
(Complaint ,r 18). These are claims that most certainly would be actionable if conducted by a
private person or entity, and thus an appropriate tort claim against ISP. Additionally, such claims
clearly fit within the definitions of "gross negligence" and "reckless, willful and wanton conduct"
actionable under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. IC § 6-904C. Simply put, the "gravamen" of
Raymond's case is not "negligent investigation," but rather intentional misconduct and a
violation of a number of laws, which are actionable as a tort.
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D.

Raymond's Damages are not Speculative but are Provable and Presumed because of
the Defendants' Wrongful Conduct.
Again, without addressing any of the damages specifically alleged by Raymond,

defendant Payette suggests that Raymond's damages are "speculative" because in effect they
were not "anticipated." In considering basic principles of tort law and the types of damages
allowed, again, Payette is misguided. Indeed:
The general rule of damages in tort is that the injured party may recover for all detriment
caused whether it could have been anticipated or not ... one who commits a wrongful act
is liable for all the direct injury resulting from such act, although such resulting injury
could not have been contemplated as a probable result of the act done.
Id. (citations omitted) See, also Restat 2d of Torts, § 910 (One injured by the tort of another is

entitled to recover damages from the other for all harm, past, present and prospective, legally
caused by the tort.)
Idaho's jury instruction manual identifies various types of "proximate" damages that
could be applicable in this case, including "economic" damages such as past and future earnings
lost as a result of the injury, or opportunity costs, as well as non-economic damages such as the
suffering of physical and mental pain. IDJI2d § 9.01. See also, Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 314 (Idaho 201 0)(holding that the jury properly awarded damages

for damage to family finances and substantial emotional and mental stress.)
The long established standard with regard to the proving of damages, is that:
Damages need be proved only with a "reasonable certainty," and this means that the
existence of damages must be taken out of the realm of speculation. The mere fact that it
is difficult to arrive at an exact amount of damages, where it is shown that damages
resulted, does not mean that damages may not be awarded; it is for the trier-of-fact to fix
the amount.
Trilogy Network Sys. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Idaho 2007)(citations
omitted)
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Moreover, courts have emphasized that an inability to prove exact damages should not absolve
wrongful acts:
The law requires only that some reasonable basis of computation of damages be used, and
the damages may be computed even if the result reached is an approximation. This is
especially true where ... it is the wrongful acts of the defendant that have created the
difficulty in proving the amount of loss of profits. The fact that the amount of damage
may not be susceptible of exact proof or may be uncertain, contingent or difficult of
ascertainment does not bar recovery.

Marsu, B. V. v. Walt Disney Co., 185 F.3d 932, 938-939 (9th Cir. Cal. 1999) (citations omitted)
Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court has noted that particularly in cases where there has been
"breach of a duty of law" resulting in "unliquidated damages" that the "best evidence" to prove
such damages is "often nothing better than the opinions of persons well informed upon the
subject under investigation." Conley v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 74 Idaho 416, 423-424, 263
P.2d 705, 709 (Idaho 1953).
Finally, as it relates to a spoliation claim, the Viviano acknowledges this well founded
principle, i,e, that "mere uncertainty as to the amount of damages will not preclude a recovery
even though proof of the amount of damages is inexact." Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 251 NJ.Super. at
129. The court upheld the decision of the jury to award lost interest, expenses and punitive
damages for the delayed judgment resulting from the spoliation claim, finding that: "On the
basis of the testimony presented to it, the jury in this case could reasonably have concluded that
(the concealed evidence) been provided to plaintiff in 1982 or 1983, (the plaintiff) would then
have obtained a settlement amount at least as large as that which she received in 1987." Viviano

v. CBS, Inc., 251 NJ.Super. at 120, 129.
Given these basic tort principles, including the presumption of damages when there has
been an intentional tort, Raymond's alleged damages are not speculative. Raymond alleges that
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such damages include "a potential loss in the value of the claim, accruing interest from the
significant delay in resolution of the claim, and general damages including severe emotional
distress and humiliation." (Complaint par. 27.) She further alleges that: "the absence of (a
conviction against Sloan) exponentially increased the cost of proving liability in Plaintiff's civil
case, and because of the defendants' evidence tampering has made it more difficult to prove
liability, making Plaintiff's civil claim significantly less valuable than it otherwise would have
been." (Complaint par. 19.)
To truly understand the harm caused by the defendants tortious interference claims, the
jury will only need to step into the shoes of Raymond and what she has witnessed and
experienced from her perspective as a result of defendants' wrongful conduct. From the very
outset, the initial ISP investigators reported that Sloan had operated his vehicle unsafely,
traveling at an high rate of speed which resulted in her father's death. They further found that
alcohol was not a factor. Sloan was then charged with felony manslaughter. This was an open
and shut case on liability for Raymond's wrongful death claim.
Instead, the ISP and Payette conspired to conceal and tamper with evidence, intimidate
and wrongfully influence testimony, and take other measures to improperly thwart these basic
and undisputable findings ofliability. They in effect improperly muddied the waters for
Ramond's wrongful death claim, delaying its resolution for many years, as well as massively
increasing the costs of pursuing such claims. A jury could also find that defendants' conduct
affected the value of her claim as well. Again, there is no requirement of "certainty" in
determining damages, particularly when there has been wrongful conduct, particularly when such
conduct created the difficulty of calculating such damages.
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The jury can also consider the emotional and mental toll the defendants' conduct has
taken on Raymond. Not only has the delay in resolving the case been emotionally and mentally
taxing upon Raymond, but she has also experienced anguish and distrust caused when rather than
promote and seek justice for wrongful and even criminal acts, law enforcement instead protected
its own from experiencing the consequences of such acts, possibly breaking the law as well in the
process. In further aggravation to Raymond, the defendants impugned the good name and
reputation of Raymond's father. Simply put, because of defendants' conduct, Raymond has lost
most all faith and trust in law enforcement, and that has resulted in massive anxiety, stress and
fear. These are all very real and consequential damages that are well beyond the realm of
speculation.
CONCLUSION

Pursuant to the foregoing, defendants' Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss should be denied.
DATED this 21 st day ofNovember, 2016.
&OLSEN
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I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, with my office in
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 21st day of November, 2016, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct
postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule 5(b), I.R.C.P.
Persons Served:

Method of Service:

Michael J. Elia, Esq.
Brady J. Hall, Esq.
MOORE & ELIA, LLP
P.O. Box 6756
Boise, ID 83707
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Attorneys for Defendant,
Idaho State Police

FAX: (208) 336-7031
EMAIL: mje@melawfim1.net
brady@melawfirm.net

~

Michael J. Kane, Esq.
( ) mail ( ) hand ( flax ( mail
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
/4355 W. Emerald St., Ste. 190
Attorneys for Defendants, Payette County
P.O. Box 2865
and Scott Sloan
Boise, Idaho 83701
FAX: (208) 342-2323
EMAIL: mkane@ktlaw.net

Sheri McCain
August Cahill
Honorable Christopher S. Nye
Canyon County Court

sy Chambers Copy

EMAIL: secsm@canyonco.org (Courtesy Chambers Cop
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTIIICI' Qi'

l'llll'UTY

THE STATE OP IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an heir,
and as Personal _RepresentatiYe of the :Estate of
Bany Johnson,

Case No,CV~201S-9S4
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ONPLAINTIFF'S MOTION

Plaintiff,

TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT AND
DEFENDANTS' I.R.CP.12(bX6)
MO'DON 10 DISMa COUNTS II
ANDm

vs.
IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State apcy,
PAYE1TE COUNTY, 11. political subdivision of
the State of Idaho, and SCOIT SLOAN
Ddendants.

Pwntiffs motion t.o· ~ - and Pa~-Co~tf' s ~JtC.P. ll(t,)(6) ~on cmm on for
hearing on November .28, 2016. ~ ~~ Poli(:e . C'I$nj~iiµ,d.in fayette County's motion.

I.

BACKGROUND

This lawsuit .ltemS from a traffic accident that occurred in Payette County on October 13,
. . . . :, .•· .. ·.·
2011. l:>eputy Scott Sloan ("Sloan") was on duty and~ his ~-veJucle on-.Highway 30
.'

when he hit Bany Johnson. Mr. Johnson died as a ~ t of~ cr&AA.. .
•;

...

; ',· .

ISP inv~gatcd the crash. SlQan was charied -with

.

vchicular manslaughter in Pa,ette

C.oonty case CR-2012-S66. The spec.ial prosecutor dismissed the case on March 8, 201-3.

Raymond filed her compJaint on February 27. 2015. In the complaint, she aDcaes three

causes of action: Count 1-Wrongful ·Deadl·{Payctte County): Count Il-Tonious Interference
with Prospective Action (all Defendants); and, Count ID-Tortious Jn~oc with ~spectiye
.

. .

.

.

.•

.

Economic
Advantaae (all Defen~ts; in the altcmative to ~Wlt
..
. Il).
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STANDARD
The decision to grant leave to amend is discretionary and shall be freely gi\1en when

justice so requires. I.R.C.P. 15. Leave to amend is properly denied when the amendment would

be futile or fails

to

state a valid claim. PHH Mortg. v. Nickerson, 160 Idaho 388 (2016). The

burden to show why a court should not grant leave to 8.mffld is on the parties opposed to the
amendment. Clark v. Olien. 110 Idaho 323, 326 (1986).

A request to dismiss a claim pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) will be aranted if the pleading

fails to stat.c a claim up0n which review can be Bl'8Iltcd, The standard is whether the non-moving
party "bas alleged sufficient facts in

support of bis claim, which if true, would entitle him to

rclicf." Orrock v. APJMlton, 147 Idaho 613, 618 (:2.000). Factual allegations will be considered
true, uoless they arc pumy conclusory. Id. "After viewing all facts and inferences from tbe
record in favor of the non-moving p~y1 ,,the Co_urt,,
... . .\_Vill. ·,.~.k.. whether ~..claim for Jelief bas ~

stated. The issue is_ not whether the plaintiff will ulthnately prevail, but_ wldiei-the party ·is
entitled to offer evidence to SllppO[t the clahna." Coal. for Agrlc. 11 F~e v, Canyon Cty., -160
Idaho 142, 145 (2016).

"[E]very reasoD!lhle

i~~
to
.. '
._will.
'.
. -.be
.- - '.made
......
~

12(b)(6) motion to disllliss." Ha~r v. Harptr, l~

sustain a complaint against a. Rule

.ldahos,s_, 536 (Q. App: 1~). "A motion

to dismiss uncb" LR.C.P.
... unl~
the. . O®--ntoving
party
woul.41
be
. 12(b)(6) will not be granted
·'
.
.
..
.
.·
'

~le to prove any conceivable set of facts in su~ of its. claim." Yoakum v. H_artfo~ Fi~

Ins. Co., 129 Idabo 171, 175 (1996);
Orthrru:tn. v. Idaho Power Co., 126.. Idaho 960, 962 (1995);
.
.
.
Wackerli v. Marti1uJ'!.k, 82 ldah<> 400 (l~).,~'14\] dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likel;Y to be

granted only in the unu&ual case in which the plaintµ! includes allcgati~ sbowi11g on ~ f~
of tile complaint that there is some insU1JI10untabl~ bar to_reli~." Harper, 122 Idaho at S36.,
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DISCUSSION
A

Motion to Amend

To recover in tort, Plaintiff must file a timely tort claim notice detailing the conduct and
circumstances giving rise to the claim. J.C.§§ 6-907-910. The parties dispute whether Plaintiff
complied with the ITCA notice requirements with respect to Counts

n. Ill, and the breach of

privacy and dignity claim. Whether Plaintiff complied with the notice requirements is a question

of fact. Cox v. Ciry of Sa,,dpotn1, 140 Idaho 127 (Ct. App. 2003). Courts take ..a liberal approach
to interpreting the notice requirement of the ITCA.,, CNW. lLC v. New Swtden Irrigation Dist,,

161 Idaho 89 (2016); I.C. § 6-907. Thus, the Coort will not deny the motion to amend based on
failure to tile a tort claim notice. The claim will fail if the jmy finds That Plaintiff did not satisfy

the lTCA notice req~mcnts.
Plaintiff wants tQ add a claim for breach of privacy and dignity against Payette County

and Does 1-X for conduct of.disparcbers and officers.in relaying infynnation _about the ~ k ~

Mr. Johnson's death. Plaintiff alleges that the -dispatchen
failed to notify Plaintiff .~out the
'•

~
.. :

~

9fficers were _unprofcssj~nal.

before .tl\)tifying
the public:, made
inappropriate
.
.
.
:

comments about Mr. Johnson and his family members.

~

did not treat Plaintiff with respect.

Plaintiff alleges that lhe conduct caused her to suffer severe emotio~ and mental anpsb an~

humiliation, to lose faith in law enforcement,
.
. and to. fear. for hei: well-being.

Breach of privacy and diguity is ~

aQ.

.

~ta~liibe!l ton ~ Idaho. Conduct is no_t

actionable me~y because it is idoonaideralc and unki~. John~~n v._ McPhee, 147 Idaho 455
(Ct.App.2009); Bro~ v. Fritz, 108 ldabo 357 (1985). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached

a. duty owed to deeedent's family members and next of kin to properly handle highly sensitive
information in times
of ttagedy.
~lajntiff does...~~
point to ·.~ statute .or rule that
C11:pressly
state~
.
.
.
. ...
.
.
..
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that 911 dispatchers and/or law enforcement officers owe such a dllty, and it docs not appear that

there is one. 1 Thus, Plaintiff is asking the Court to find that a new duty exists.
''Generally, the questiOD whether a doty exists is a question of law." Udy v. Custer Cty.,

136 Idaho 386, 389 {2001). H[l]t is possible to aeate a duty where one previously did not exist."

Id. Detennining whether a duty will arise in a particular context •1nvolves a consideration of
policy and the weighing of several factors(,]" including:
[T]he foreseeability of hann to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injwy, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached t.o the defcndant's
conduct, the policy of preventing future harm. the extent of the bmden to the
defendant and c011Scquences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care
with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost. and prevalence of

insurance for the risk involved.

·

R.ife v. Lortg, 127:ldabo 841, 846_(1~5);,Trupell_ ~- Granieri, 133 ldall().244, 247-48 (1999). In
weighing these considerations, the burden on·. dispar.cbers
and·. law cnfmccmcnt would be
.
'

enormous, The Court will not find that such a duty arises in this contf!~t. ';[',here can be no liability
on this particular theory, Suwners v. Camb~g~ Joint Sch. Dist. No. 432, 139 .Jdaho 95~. 955

(2004) ("'Only when a defendant owes a du~y lo. ~.Piaintiff.~
tort .l~~ility exist.").
.
. . . .
Wbili,

Plaintiff's breach of privacy and dignity theory is not a viable claim. she alleged

facts which may support a claim for 'intrusion upon seclusion. See ~1de1'8on v. BOMer, 142 Idaho
733, 739 (Ct App. 2006); Ur@ga v. Federaud Publicatkms,. I11e'.~ 138. Idaho SSO, .553 (2003):
Hoskins v. Howard, 132 Idaho 311. (1998). Pl~tiff may ·amend ihe co~laint to .include a claim
••

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

,

4

•

~.

for inrrusion upon seclusion. Se~ I.R.C.P. 8; Navo v. Bingham Mem'l Hosp.• 373 P.3d 681, 693
(Idaho 2016) ("Under notice pleading, a party is no longer slavishly bound to stating wticular

is

Even if first notifying nexl of kin a common practice, ii ~oes not iraiisbie into a legal duty to do so in the
Sa, Udy 11. C,,_r Cry.. _136 ldaho 386, 389-90 (200_1). _..,. . .
1
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Cbeoties in its pleadings. Rathel. a party is required to state an underlying cause of action and the
facts from which that cause of action arises.").

B.

LR.C.P, 12lh}C6l motion

The Defendants seek dismissal of Counts I_I and m. The gist of these claims is that the
Defendants conspired to cover-up, conceal, and falsify evidence, and/or wlawfully influenced or
interfered with the investigation S\Ul'OWJding Sloan, resulting in dismissal of Sloan,s criminal

case. Plaintiff alleges that, but for the Defendants' cover~up and intcderence, Sloan would have
been convicted and such conviction would have rendered liability res judicata. The absence of
the cocviclion exponentially increased the cost of proving liability in Plaintitrs civil case. As a
result, the Defendants reduced the value of Plaintiff's wrongful cbth claim.
0

1.

Count 11-Toriious i,11iifirenct wt11i'Proij,,ctivi Acikm

There is no private cause of action for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512, 1.C.

H 18-2604,

and -2605. The basis for this claim comes from Yoakum v. Hariford Fire Ins. Co., 129 ldabo 171

(1996), in which the ldaho S_upremc Court "opine[d]

011

a possible _cause of action" known _as

spoliation of evidence.

In Yoakum, the Court noted tbat spoliation is its own _intentional tort. The Court
said that "[t]hc guidelines offered by the authon of thelttstatcmcnt and the cases
which have dc1iDcd lhc .intentional spoliation of evidcm:c cause of action pro-ride
a framework for another canse of ·action based· upon intentional conduct mat
unreasonably intederea with a party's prospectjve caµse of action. The tort of
intentional spoliation of evidence bas been alternatively identified by couns as the
'intentional i n ~ with prospt.cti~e civil !ICtion by ~poliation of evidence.• "
[Yoal:wn, 129 ldalio] at 178 (citing Hazen v. Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463
(Alaska 198_6)). _The Court also stated that it i~ closely,~~ with the tort of
·intentional intcrference with a prospective business advantage. ldt.iho First Not'l
Bank v. Blis.t Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 284-87 (1991).

l.
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Ricketts v. E. Idaho Equip. Co., 137 Idaho 578, 582 (2002). Idaho courts have not adopted it as
an independent cause of action. Id.; Cook v. State Dept. of Tnl11S., 133 Idaho 288 (1999).

Plaintiff asks this Court to adopt it as an independent cause of action.
The decision to fashion and create a new intentional tort is discretionary. Yoakum, 129
Idaho at 177-178. (RcstatemMt (Second) of TOl.'tS provides "mere guidelines for a court to use in
fashioning the contours of new intentional torts a court may wish to create."). Although Yoakum

recognized in dicta that spoliation is an mdependent tort, the spoliation doctrine has not been
adopted as an .independent cause of action. Rather, it has been applied as a rule of evidence and
pcnnits an inference and a jury instruction on spoliation. Courtney v. Big O Tires, Inc., 139

Idaho 821 (2003); Rtcuas, ,upra; Cook, supra; Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 8f1l (1999);,Sn.an
V:

St~, 127 ldah9 806 (1995). The Court ~~C$ to adopt it as !ID. independent ~use of action.

2. Count Hl-Tonioua Interference with Prospective Economic Advantagt
Tottious interference with a prospective economic advantage is recognized in Idaho. In
'

order to establish the claim, Plaintiff must show:

'.

;

( 1) the existence of a valid ecoQO.~c ex~~y.. (2) knowledge of the
expectancy on the part of the blterferer, (3) wtentional' inter.femnce inducing
termination of the cx~cy, (4) the interference was wrongful by some measwe
beyond the fact of the interference itself, and (S) resulting damage to the plaintiff
whose expectaDCy bas been disrupted.
Syringa Networkl, UC v. ldaho l>ep't of Admin., ISS Idaho 5S, 64 (2013). Plaintiff alleges that

she "had a valid ccooomic expectancy known to the defendants in the form of Plaintiff's claims
.

.

....
.. ,.

,

.

....
.

.

and causes of action against Sloan aod Payette County arising from the death of Mr. Johnson"

and that the Defendants "int.entionally interfered with Plaintiffs valid economic expectancy,
resulting in the reduction. destruction, or disruption thereof." (Complaint, TI 36,.37).

This tort addresses interference with 811 "economic relationship" between a plaintiff and

another party. Highlan.d Ente~rl.res, lnc.·;.··•~~r;· 133 ldaho 330,339 n. 3 (1999). The ·purpose
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of this toa is to protect the incegrity of, and expectancies in, voluntarily created economic
relationships, both commercial and noncommercial, that would have very likely resulted in a
pecuniary benefit to the plaintiff but for the defendant's interference. See rd.; Fox v. Country Mut.

Ins. Co., 1 P.3d 677 (Or, 2000); Cron v. Zimmer, 296 P.3d 567 (Or. 2013). A civil lawsuit docs
not repICSent the kind of noncomm~ial relationship and prospective economic advantage
protected by the tort of inlc.ntional interference with an economic advantage. Id. Plaintiff does
oot have a valid economic expectancy in this lawsuit.

Addidonally, Counts II and mare premised on a fact that Plaintiff c:annot prove; That but
for the Defendants' alleged misconduct, Sloan would have hr.en convicted of man.slaughter. If
these counts proceed to trial, the jury would be asked to ·consider the merits of Sloan's criminal

case and decide whether, by a preponderance of evidence, Sloan would have been convb;ted
beyond a reuonable doubt. There. are. ~Y.: poa&~bl~ ,.ou~mcs in a criminal case, and

speculating about one possible ou~come in Sloan's criminal.case is not a basis for relief in-this
civil case. Plaintiff cannot prove this conclusory fact and it is an i.nmrm,ountable bar to relief.
Finally, even if these are viable claims, they are premature.~ the outcome in this case
needs to be known before Plaintiff can

re.duce4. City of McCaU

11.

s~~

1~t. the_ val~e of her wrongful death claims was

Buxton, 146 Idaho 656 (2008) (A tort claim cannot accrue until an

· injury is sustained Ol' act\lal damage occurs).

,

I,

:
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ORDER
THEREFORE, IT JS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Plaintiff's motion to amend is GRANTED, In part, and DENIED, in part;
2. Defendants" I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Counts nand mis GRANTED.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this t/1_ day of J)~C. ·
, 2016, a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing document was addressed and delivered as indicated
below:

Nathan Olsen
Petenen Moss Hall & Olsen
485 ''E'' Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Michael Kane

Michael Kane & Associates, PU.C

[I

U.S. Mail, pmtage prepaid
Hand~ercd

[ !,
[/]

Facsimile

[ ]
[ )

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-delivered

4355 W. Emerald St.. Ste. 190
P.O. Box 2865
Boise, Idaho 83701

I .,Y'

Facsimile

Michael J. Elia
Moore & Elia, LLP
P.O. Box 6756
Boise, Idaho 83707

[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

[ J .liend-dc__ livcred
'/.

[ ,1'1

·

Facsimile
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THIii) JUDICIAL Dl8TIIICT COURT
PA~ COUNTY, 10AHO

JAN 112017

u

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS~J. &eN, CLERK
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYE'ITE
JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an heir,

and as Personal Representative oftJie Estate of
Barry Johnson,
Plaintiff,

Cue No. CV-2015-00954-C

PARTIAL JUDGMENT Of
DISMISSAL OF IDAHO STATE
POLICE

vs.

IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State
agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political'
subdivision of the State ofldaho, and SCOTT
SLOAN,

Defendants.
JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: ·
That Plaintiffs• claims against Defendant Idaho

s._

Police ~e dismissed with prejudice,

that Plaintiffs take nothing from said Defendant, and that this action is dismissed as to Idaho

State Police only.
DATED this ~ y of..!o=oo=::::::J!lll¥.l14A11UM,t

Christopher S. Nye
District Judge
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I
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/4,1,

,

1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h i s ~ day of
2017, I caused to
be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
Nathan M. Olsen
Petersen, Moss, Hall & Olsen
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Attorneys for Plaintiff

___ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Facsimile Transmission 208-524-3391
~ E-Mail: nolsen@pmholaw.com

Michael J. Kane

_ _ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Facsimile TrallSJDission 208-342-2323
E-Mail: m1qrqe@k1YJw.net

Michael Kane Associates
4355 West Emerald Street, Suite 190
P.O. Box 2865
Boise, ID 83701-2865
Attorneys for Defendants Payette County and
Scott Sloan
Michael J. Elia
Brady J. Hall
MOORE, ELIA, KRAFT & HALL, LLP
Post Office Box 6756

2:

_

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Facsimile Transmission 208-336-703 l

ZE-~~ mje@melarinn.net

Boise, Idaho 83707

Attorneys for Defendant Idaho State Police
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Electronically Filed
7/5/2018 1:45 PM
Third Judicial District, Payette County
Betty Dressen, Clerk of the Court
By: Julie Anderson, Deputy Clerk

MICHAEL J. KANE
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
4355 West Emerald Street, Suite 190
Post Office Box 2865
Boise, Idaho 83701-2865
Telephone: (208) 342-4545
Facsimile: (208) 342-2323
Email: mkane@ktlaw.net
Idaho State Bar No. 2652
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT PAYETTE COUNTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an heir,
and as Personal Representative of the Estate of
BARRY JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State
Agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho, SCOTT
SLOAN, and JOHN and JANE DOES I-X,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2015-00954-C
STIPULATION TO DISMISS
WITH PREJUDICE

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, JACKIE RAYMOND, by and through her attorney of
record, Nathan Olsen, of the firm Petersen, Moss, Hall & Olsen, and the Defendant, PAYETTE
COUNTY, by and through its attorneys of record Michael J. Kane of the firm Michael Kane &
Associates, PLLC, and do hereby stipulate and agree to the dismissal of this lawsuit with

STIPULATION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE– P. 1
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prejudice. Each side shall bear their own fees and costs associated with the dismissal of this
lawsuit.
DATED this

),fr

day of

_<:Ii..',Jj~f:.-_, 2018.
, , rALL & OLSEN

Nathan Olsen
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DATED this _ _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ 2018.
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

BY: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
MICHAEL J. KANE
Attorneys for Defendant

STIPULATION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE- P. 2
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prejudice. Each side shall bear their own fees and costs associated with the dismissal of this
lawsuit.
DATED this ________ day of ____________, 2018.
PETERSEN, MOSS, HALL & OLSEN

BY: ________________________________________
Nathan Olsen
Attorneys for Plaintiff
DATED this 5th day of July, 2018.
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
BY:

/s/ Michael J. Kane
Attorneys for Payette County
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of July, 2018, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below and addressed to the
following:
Counsel for Plaintiff:
Nathan M. Olsen
Peterson Moss Hall & Olsen
485 “E” Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
[Email: nolsen@pmholaw.com]

_______ Email

Counsel for ISP:
Mr. Michael J. Elia
Moore & Elia, LLP
P. O. Box 6756
Boise, ID 83707
[Facsimile: #(208) 336-7031]
[Email: mje@melawfirm.net]

__XX__ Email

__XX__ iCourt eFile/eServe

_______ iCourt eFile/eServe

/s/ Michael J. Kane
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FILED

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PAYETTE COUNTY, IDAHO

MICHAEL J. KANE (JSB No. 2652)
BARBARA BEEHNER-KANE (ISB No. 2853)
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

JUL 10 2018
8~ESSEN,CLEAK

t~/,-..V-

4355 West Emerald Street, Suite 190
Post Office Box 2865
Boise, Idaho 83701-2865
Telephone: (208) 342-4545
Facsimile: (208) 342-2323
Email: mkane@ktlaw.net and bbeehner(@,ktlaw.net

BY--n

.-----DEPUTY

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT PAYETTE COUNTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an heir,
and as Personal Representative of the Estate of
BARRY JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State
Agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho, SCOTT
SLOAN, and JOHN and JANE DOES I-X,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2015-00954-C
FINAL JUDGMENT

----------------)
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
All claims against all parties are hereby dismissed with prejudice. No attorney fees or costs
are awarded.
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JUDGE CHRISTOPHER NYE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

DJ

,

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on
7
2018, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by th~ method indicated below and addressed to the
following:
U.S. Mail
- - - Facsimile

Counsel for Plaintiff:

Nathan M. Olsen
Peterson Moss Hall & Olsen
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
[Email: nolsen@pmholaw.com]

-7-...,...Email
iCourt eFile/eServe

---

Mail
- - - U.S.
Facsimile

Counsel for Defendant Payette County:

Mr. Michael J. Kane
Michael Kane & Associates, PLLC
4355 West Emerald Street, Suite 190
Boise, ID 83706
[Email: mkane@ktlaw.net]

---

........-Email
iCourt eFile/eServe

---

Counsel for ISP:
Mr. Michael J. Elia
Moore & Elia, LLP

- - - U.S. Mail

P. 0. Box 6756
Boise, ID 83 707
[Facsimile: #(208) 336-7031]
[Email: mje(a),melawfirm.net]

- - - iCourt eFile/eServe

Facsimile
--lz--- Email

CLERK
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Electronically Filed
8/17/2018 11:18 AM
Third Judicial District, Payette County
Betty Dressen, Clerk of the Court
By: Julie Anderson, Deputy Clerk

Nathan M. Olsen, Esq., ISB # 7373
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN
485 "E" Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone: (208) 523-4650
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391
E-mail: nolsen@pmholaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an
heir, and as Personal Representative of the
Estate of BARRY JOHNSON,

Case No. CV-2015-954

Plaintiff,
v.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State
agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho, SCOTT
SLOAN, and JOHN and JANE DOES I-X,

Filing fee: $129.00
Fee Category: L.4.

Defendants.

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT, IDAHO STATE POLICE; THE PARTY’S
ATTORNEY, Michael J. Elia, P.O. Box 6756, Boise, Idaho 83707; and THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE- ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named appellant, Jackie Raymond, individually as an heir, and as

Personal Representative of the Estate of Barry Johnson, appeals against the above named

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1
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Defendant, Idaho State Police, an Idaho State agency, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Final
Judgment entered in the above entitled action on July 10, 2018, Honorable Christopher S. Nye,
presiding.
2.

Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment

described in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1), I.A.R.
3.

The preliminary statement of the issues on appeal that the appellant intends to

assert in the appeal are as follows:
A.

Did the district court err in dismissing the plaintiff’s tortious interference
claims against the defendant Idaho State Police under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure?

4.

Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No

5.

Is a reporter’s transcript requested? No

6.

The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's

record as it pertains to the appeal and defendant Idaho State Police:
A.

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed February 27, 2015, (initially
in Ada County, subsequently transferred to Payette County).

B.

Defendant Idaho State Police’s (ISP) Answer to Complaint, filed
February 4, 2016.

C.

Defendant ISP’s Joinder in Payette County’s Motion for Partial Dismissal
Pursuant to IRCP § 12(b)(6), filed November 14, 2016.

D.

Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Rule 12 Motion for Partial
Dismissal, filed November 25, 2016.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

Page 125

E.

Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Amend and IRCP
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, filed December 30, 2016.

7.

F.

Final Judgment entered July 10, 2018.

G.

Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal filed August 17, 2018.

The appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or

admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: NOT APPLICABLE
8.

I certify:
A.

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set
out below:
No additional transcripts have been ordered.

B.

That if transcripts have been requested, the clerk of the district court has
been paid the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter’s transcript.

C.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk’s record has been paid.

D.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

E.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20, I.A.R.

DATED this 17th day of August, 2018.
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN

/s/ Nathan M. Olsen
Nathan M. Olsen
Attorneys for Appellant

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

Page 126

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 17th day of August, 2018, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:
Persons Served:

Method of Service:

Attorneys for Defendant, Idaho State Police
Michael J. Elia, Esq.
MOORE, ELIA, KRAFT & HALL, LLP
P.O. Box 6756
Boise, Idaho 83707

(U) mail
( ) fax
( ) email
(U) iCourt eFile/eServe

FAX: (208) 336-7031
EMAIL: mje@melawfirm.net

Attorneys for Defendants, Payette County
and Scott Sloan
Michael J. Kane, Esq.
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
4355 W. Emerald St., Ste. 190
P.O. Box 2865
Boise, Idaho 83701

( ) mail
( ) fax
( ) email
(U) iCourt eFile/eServe

FAX: (208) 342-2323
EMAIL: mkane@ktlaw.net

Courtesy Chambers Copy To:
Clerk to Judge Christopher S. Nye
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

(U) email

EMAIL: secls@canyonco.org
acahill@canyonco.org

/s/ Nathan M. Olsen
Nathan M. Olsen
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

Jacqueline Marie Raymond
vs.
Idaho State Police Patrol Region 3,
Payette County, Scott Jacob Sloan

Supreme Court No. 46272-2018
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

I, Julie Anderson, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the
State of Idaho in and for the County of Payette, do hereby certify that the following
documents will be submitted as exhibits to the Record:

Court Exhibits
NONE
Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibits
NONE
Defendant’s Trial Exhibits
NONE

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
said Court on this the 20th day of September, 2018.
BETTY DRESSEN
Clerk of the Court
Seal
By:
Deputy Clerk

Certificate of Exhibits - D (MISC28)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

Jacqueline Marie Raymond
vs.
Idaho State Police Patrol Region 3,
Payette County, Scott Jacob Sloan

Supreme Court No.
CLERK’S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

Appeal from: Third Judicial District, Payette County, Honorable Christopher S. Nye presiding.
Case number from court: CV-2015-954
Order or judgment appealed from: Final Judgment filed July 10, 2018
Attorney for Appellant: Nathan Olsen
Attorney for Respondent: Michael Elia and Michael Kane
Appealed by: Plaintiff
Appealed against: Defendants
Notice of Appeal filed: August 17, 2018
Amended Notice of Appeal filed: n/a
Notice of Cross-Appeal filed: n/a
Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal filed: n/a
Appellate fee paid: yes on August 17, 2018 None:
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's Request for additional record filed: n/a
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's Request for additional transcript filed: n/a
Transcript filed: no
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? no
If requested, name of each reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below
at the address below: n/a
BETTY DRESSEN
Clerk of the Court
Dated: 08/20/2018

By: Julie Anderson
Deputy Clerk

Clerk’s Certificate of Appeal - D (MISC26)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date, I served a copy of the attached to:
Michael John Kane
Michael Joseph Elia
Nathan Miles Olsen

mkane@ktlaw.net
mje@melawfirm.net
nolsen@pmholaw.com

Idaho Supreme Court

[X] By E-mail
[X] By E-mail
[X] By E-mail
[X]By Odyssey Task Manager

Betty Dressen
Clerk of the Court
Dated: 08/20/2018

By: Julie Anderson
Deputy Clerk

Clerk’s Certificate of Appeal - D (MISC26)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

Jacqueline Marie Raymond
vs.
Idaho State Police Patrol Region 3,
Payette County, Scott Jacob Sloan

Supreme Court No. 46272-2018
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Julie Anderson, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State
of Idaho, in and for the County of Payette, do hereby certify that I have personally served or
mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the Clerk's Record and any
Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of Record as follows:

Michael Joseph Elia
PO Box 6756
Boise ID 83707

[X] By email

Nathan Miles Olsen
485 E Street
Idaho Falls ID 83402

[X] By email

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court on this the 1st day of October, 2018.

2nd day of November, 2018
BETTY DRESSEN
Clerk of the District Court
Seal
By: Julie Anderson
Deputy Clerk

Certificate of Service - D (MISC29)

Page 1 of 1

Page 131

